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"LIKE SNOW [FALLING] ON A BRANCH...":
INTERNATIONAL LAW INFLUENCES ON DEATH PENALTY
DECISIONS AND DEBATES IN THE UNITED STATES
RUSSELL G. MURPHY* AND ERIC J. CARLSON*
"[C]apital punishment is unlikely to be undone for any one reason. Like snow
on a branch, it is not any single flake that makes the branch break, but rather the
collective weight of many flakes accumulating over time."'
INTRODUCTION
Since the United States Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia2
prohibiting the execution of severely mentally retarded individuals, significant
changes have occurred in American capital punishment law. Important restrictions
have been imposed on the types of crimes and criminals that are subject to the
death penalty. At the same time, the Court has refused to give effect to the
judgment of an international human rights tribunal ordering the United States to
review death sentences of Mexican nationals because of international law
violations,3 and has declined to invalidate the primary method, the three drug lethal
"cocktail," used to execute prisoners.4 Yet, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Court
narrowly held that the death penalty could not be constitutionally extended to non-
homicide child rape. This Article explores how these decisions have been
significantly, but unevenly, influenced by international law, foreign court decisions
and global political actions, and the effect of Supreme Court case law on the death
penalty debate in the United States.
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University School of Law. The author wishes to thank former Law School
Dean Alfred Aman for his steady support of this project. My Staff Assistant, Andrea Shannon Curley,
provided patient, sustained and totally expert assistance at every stage of the preparation of the Article.
It is dedicated to the one person whose continuing inspiration has made all of my professional
accomplishments possible, my beloved wife Professor Kate Nace Day. [This Article originates from a
lecture delivered on May 14, 2008, at Lund University, Lund Sweden. The lecture is available at
http://wwwjushumanis.org/Expert Seminars/documents/Executing Capital Punishment.doc. A full
text version of the lecture is also published, with footnotes, as Executing the Death Penalty:
International Law Influences on United States Supreme Court Decision-Making In Capital Punishment
Cases, 32 SUFFOLK TRANS. L. REv. 599 (2009).
" Eric J. Carlson is a 2009 graduate of Suffolk University Law School.
1. Richard C. Dieter, International Influence on the Death Penalty in the United States, 80
FOREIGN SERV. J. 31 (2003).
2. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that capital punishment of the
mentally retarded is cruel and unusual and prohibited by 8th amendment).
3. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008).
4. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1538 (2008).
5. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650-51 (2008).
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Part I of this Article provides a description of the basic Eighth Amendment
principles that govern the constitutionality of capital punishment law. Parts II and
III set forth foundational information on death penalty practices in the United
States and the global community, and identify specific provisions of international
law that prohibit or restrict capital punishment. Part IV describes the public debate
among Justices of the Court over the propriety of reliance on international law in
U.S. constitutional decision-making. Part V provides examples of international
law and foreign court decisions that have directly influenced opinions of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices in death penalty cases. The Article concludes with
commentary on ways in which international law can continue to impact American
capital punishment policies and practices.
PART I. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Thirty-five states and the federal government have legislatively enacted
capital punishment laws.6 These laws are subject to judicial review under the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."7
Starting with Furman v. Georgia8 and the Gregg v. Georgia line of cases, the
United States Supreme Court established clear, if not somewhat broad and general,
rules for determining when a death penalty law is valid under the Eighth
Amendment. Initially, capital punishment is not per se unconstitutional.10 The
death penalty is a constitutional criminal sentence so long as:
1. It is not imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Death
penalty statues must contain clear and precise standards that narrow the
range of crimes and criminals eligible for capital punishment to only the
"worst of the worst" and prevent discrimination on the basis of race,
gender, sexual orientation, or other impermissible factor.12
6. Death Penalty Info. Ctr. (DPIC), Facts About the Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Sept. 16, 2009)
[hereinafter DPIC Facts]. Historical statistical information on the death penalty is reported by DPIC in
Fact Sheets as noted above. Id. Statistical information for the current year is continuously updated;
however, DPIC does not maintain an archive of prior Fact Sheets. See Death Penalty Information
Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/home (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). Third party internet storage
facilities, such as Internet Archive, maintain archived reports, but these services are not supported by
DPIC. See generally id.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
8. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
9. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); see
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
10. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (discussing per se constitutionality of capital punishment).
11. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 294-95 (discussing arbitrary and capricious application).
12. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing constitutional death penalty
standards); see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 242, 249-52 (Douglas, J., concurring); Furman, 408 U.S. at
309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980). In addition, the
Woodson/Lockett line of cases requires focus on the "character and record of the individual offender
and the circumstances of the particular offense . . . ." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
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2. It "advances" a legitimate "penalogical justification," by achieving
one of the sentencing goals of the U.S. criminal justice system:
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.13 A Supreme
Court Justice's personal answer to this question-what does the death
penalty accomplish in terms of justifications for criminal punishment-
may be considered in deciding this issue.1 4
3. It is consistent with the "evolving standards of decency" recognized
by a "maturing society" and respects the "human dignity" that is at the
core of the Eighth Amendment. 5  The Amendment requires
proportionality between the crime committed and the sentence of death.
As noted above, only the "worst of the worst" criminals, the most
culpable and blameworthy, can be sentenced to death.16 A court must
(1976); Lockett v. Ohio 438 U.S. 586, 603 (1978); see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (noting some
death sentences are so arbitrary as to make the sentence "freakish"). "Difficulties in administering the
penalty to ensure against its arbitrary and capricious application require adherence to a rule reserving its
use, at this stage of evolving standards and in cases of crimes against individuals, for crimes that take
the life of the victim." Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2665 (2008). "[T]he death penalty must
be reserved for the 'worst of the worst."' Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
13. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-19 (2002) (discussing death penalty justifications);
Baze v. Reese, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1547 (Stevens, J., concurring); Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2649 (analyzing
death penalty rationales). The original rationale for the death penalty was limited to retribution and
deterrence. However, Justice Stevens has recently referred to incapacitation in Baze and Justice
Kennedy introduced rehabilitation in Kennedy. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1547 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(referring to incapacitation rationale); Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2649 (discussing rehabilitation rationale);
see also Erik Eckholm, U.S. Shifting Prison Focus To Re-entry Into Society, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/08/washington/08reentry.html (noting President Bush
would sign Second Chance Act "making rehabilitation a central goal of the federal justice system.");
The Second Chance Act of 2007, H.R. 1593, 110th Cong. (2008) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); see also Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need
For Federal Expungement Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008) (discussing Second Chance
Act).
14. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005) (discussing use of Justice's own judgment).
"The Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the
question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." Id. (quoting Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion)). When assessing the effectiveness of advancing
penalogical goals the Court considers its "own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's text, history, meaning, and purpose." Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650. "Although the
judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately to
judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty on ... [an accomplice to
felony murder]." Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
15. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (originating "evolving standards" concept);
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (referring expressly to preserving "human dignity" as central purpose of Eighth
Amendment). The Court has never repudiated the statement in Trop that the broad purpose of the
Eighth Amendment is to respect and preserve "the dignity of man." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
173 (1976).
16. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319) (discussing proportionality of
death penalty). "Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit 'a narrow category
of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes them 'the most deserving of
execution."' Id. "The Court explained in Atkins and Roper that the Eighth Amendment's protection
against excessive or cruel and unusual punishments flows from the basic 'precept of justice that
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find a "national consensus" in contemporary American society in
support of a particular death penalty practice.17 Whether there is such a
consensus is measured, first, by examining "objective" or "democratic"
evidence of public understandings in the form of legislative
enactments.' 8 A court will look at the number of states (or the federal
government) following a challenged practice and the "trends" in the
United States.19 Some Justices have also been willing to consider
opinion polls and the views of national and international organizations.20
As with sentencing goals, individual Justices can make their own
personal judgments about what evolving standards of decency tolerate
or require.2'
Until recently, these constitutional principles had been applied in a way that
led to a complex, multi-layered, highly technical body of substantive and
procedural law which has both promoted imposition of the death penalty and made
it extremely difficult to execute a death row prisoner. Yet, prior to the Court's
2007-2008 Term, perceptible changes had occurred, nationally and internationally,
that suggested a retreat from the aggressive use of capital punishment.22
punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense."' Kennedy, 128 S. Ct.
at 2649 (citations omitted) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)). "Evolving
standards . . . must . . . respect . . . the dignity of the person." Id. "Gregg instructs that capital
punishment is excessive when it is grossly out of proportion to the crime or it does not fulfill the two
distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes." Id. at
2661.
17. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 563 (discussing need for "national consensus"). "The evidence of
national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles is similar, and in some respects parallel, to the
evidence Atkins held sufficient to demonstrate a national consensus against the death penalty for the
mentally retarded." Id. at 564.
18. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2642 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 563). The Court
is guided by "objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state
practice with respect to executions." Id.
19. See Roper, 543 U.S. 551, 563-65 (2005) (noting death penalty trends). "The number of States
that have abandoned capital punishment for juvenile offenders . . . is smaller than the number of States
that abandoned capital punishment for the mentally retarded . .. ; yet we think the same consistency of
direction of change has been demonstrated." Id. at 564-66. A national consensus can also be
demonstrated in the states without a formal prohibition because the practice of executing juveniles and
the mentally retarded is infrequent. Id. at 564-65. Since 1989, only five states have executed offenders
known to have an IQ under 70 and only six states have executed prisoners for crimes committed as
juveniles. Id. at 564. Furthermore, in the past 10 years, only Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia have
done so. Id. at 565.
20. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2657 (discussing the use of execution statistics as evidence of
societal acceptance); see also Atkins v. Virgina, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n. 21 ("[P]olling data shows a
widespread consensus among Americans, even those who support the death penalty, that executing the
mentally retarded is wrong.").
21. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976) (Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ., joint
opinion) (discussing death penalty and sentencing goals); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597
(comparing the role of judiciary, juries and legislature in death penalty cases); supra note 14 and
accompanying text (discussing judgment of Justices).
22. See James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment, 1963 2006, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 14-19 (2007); see also ALAN W. CLARK & LAURELYN
WHITT, THE BITTER FRUIT OF AMERICAN JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC RESISTANCE TO
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PART II. A NATIONAL TREND AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY?
The Court's three most important recent substantive death penalty opinions,
23 24 2Kennedy v. Louisiana, Roper v. Simmons, and Atkins v. Virginia strongly
emphasized trends in capital punishment practices applying "evolving standards of
decency" under the Eighth Amendment. Two things were clear about such trends
at the mid-point of 2008. American death penalty policies are continually
26subjected to intense, sustained, and widespread criticism. And, reliance on
capital punishment as the ultimate criminal sanction has steadily declined during
the last decade.27 These realities led Justice John Paul Stevens to conclude that the
death penalty represents "the pointless and needless extinction of life," produces
"only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes," and
21should be abandoned by state and federal governments. Justice Kennedy
matched the power of these words in another opinion observing that, "[w]hen the
law punishes by death, it risks its own sudden descent into brutality, transgressing
the constitutional commitment to decency and restraint."29
Basic criticisms of state execution in the United States are easily catalogued.
There is still no generally accepted evidence that the death penalty deters murder
or other extremely violent crime.30  Decision-making in capital cases is
THE DEATH PENALTY 11-13 (Northeastern Univ. Press 2008).
23. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
24. See Roper v. Simmons, 553 U.S. 551 (2005).
25. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
26. See discussion infra Part IV (describing debate among Supreme Court Justices and recent
history of death penalty litigation at Supreme Court).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 42-53 and accompanying text (illustrating reduction in
reliance on capital punishment and death sentences).
28. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1551 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
29. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008).
30. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1547 (evaluating deterrence as an effective justification of capital
punishment). "The legitimacy of deterrence as an acceptable justification for the death penalty is ...
questionable, at best." Id. "Despite 30 years of empirical research in the area, there remains no reliable
statistical evidence that capital punishment in fact deters potential offenders. In the absence of such
evidence, deterrence cannot serve as a sufficient penological justification for this uniquely severe and
irrevocable punishment." Id. (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux:
Science, Law and Causal Reasoning on Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255 (2006)
(discussing the numerous technical and conceptual errors of current deterrence studies); John J.
Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58
STAN. L. REV. 791 (2005) (criticizing research methodologies and questioning results); see also Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Deterring Murder: A Reply, 58 STAN. L. REV. 847 (2005) (discussing
moral commitments behind deterrence in the death penalty debate); Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital
Punishment is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 751 (2005) (criticizing Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule's argument that because deterrence is
supported by empirical evidence, the death penalty is morally permissible); cf Adam Liptak, Does the
Death Penalty Save Lives? A New Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, at 11 (discussing the debate
surrounding deterrence and the death penalty); Robert Tanner, Studies Say Death Penalty Deters Crime,
WASH. POST, June 11, 2007 (reporting that empirical studies show the death penalty to be a deterrent to
crime); DPIC, Experts From Both Sides Say Data Does Not Support A Deterrent Effect From The
Death Penalty, posted June 30, 2008, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/experts-both-sides-
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unavoidably arbitrary, from the initial prosecutorial choice to seek the death
penalty, to judge and jury sentencing. 31 Racial and ethnic discrimination permeate
the system. 32 The catharsis of retribution is widely rejected.33 Decades often pass
say-data-does-not-support-deterrent-effect-death-penalty (referencing Cass Sunstein & Justin Wolfers,
WASH. POST, June 30, 2008); but see H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row:
Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J. L. & EcoN. 453 (2003);
Roy Adler & Michael Summers, Capital Punishment Works, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2007, at A13
(asserting deterrent effect of death penalty).
31. DPIC, Arbitrariness, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/arbitrariness (last visited Feb. 23,
2009). DPIC has documented evidence of arbitrariness in the use of the death penalty in such areas as
geography, race, representation, jury mistakes, and gender. Id. A recent example includes an editorial
in the Virginian-Pilot highlighting arbitrary application of the death penalty. See DPIC, EDITORIAL:
Imperfections Abound with Death Penalty, THE VA.-PILOT, Nov. 7, 2008, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/editorial-imperfections-abound-death-penalty (last visited Feb. 23,
2009); PilotOnline.com, Imperfections Abound with Death Penalty, Nov. 7, 2008,
http://hamptonroads.conV2008/11/imperfections-abound-death-penalty (last visited Feb. 23, 2009); see
also ROMY GANSCHOW, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, DEATH BY
GEOGRAPHY: A COUNTY BY COUNTY ANALYSIS OF THE ROAD TO EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA (Elise
Banducci, Jeff Gillenkirk & Natasha Minsker eds. ACLU), available at
http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminaljustice/death_penalty/death bygeography/death bygeography.
pdf. "California's death penalty has become so arbitrary that the county border, not the facts of the
case, determines who is sentenced to execution and who is simply sentenced to die in prison." Id. at 1.
The report indicates that residents of Alameda County are nearly eight times more likely to be given a
death sentence than residents of similar demographics of nearby Santa Clara County. Id. In New York,
upstate counties represent approximately 65% of capital prosecutions, despite representing only 20% of
the state's homicides. See NEW YORK STATE CAPITAL DEFENDER OFFICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
NEW YORK STATE: STATISTICS FROM EIGHT YEARS OF REPRESENTATION, 1995-2003 (Capital Defender
Office 2003). Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court released a report that found there is "unsettling
statistical evidence indicating that cases involving killers of white victims are more likely to progress to
a penalty phase than cases involving killers of African-American victims." Hon. David S. Baime,
Report to the Supreme Court, Systemic Proportionality Review Project: 2000-2001 Term 2-3 (2001).
32. See DPIC, supra note 31 (discussing death penalty arbitrariness and discrimination); see also
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: DEATH BY DISCRIMINATION - THE
CONTINUING ROLE OF RACE IN CAPITAL CASES (2003), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/asset/AMR51/046/2003/en/bd8584ef-d712-1ldd-bocc-1f0860013475/amr510462003en.pdf.
Between 1976 and 1999, blacks and whites were murdered at a nearly equal pace. Id. at 1. Despite the
racial equality among victims, eighty percent of people executed since 1977 were convicted of
murdering white victims. Id. at 5. Similar discriminatory results have been found in cases with victims
of high socio-economic status. See BALDUS, D.C., ET AL., FINAL REPORT ON THE DISPOSITION OF
NEBRASKA CAPITAL AND NON-CAPITAL HOMICIDE CASES (1973-1999): A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS (Neb. Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice 2001). "[S]ince 1973
defendants whose victims have high socio-economic status have faced a significantly higher risk of
advancing to a penalty trial and receiving a death sentence. Defendants with low SES victims have
faced a substantially reduced risk of advancing to a penalty trial and of being sentenced to death." Id. at
22; see also Symposium, Racial discrimination and the death penalty in the post-Furman era: An
Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 18 CORNELL L. REV. 1638
(1998); Symposium, Race, Crime and the Constitution: Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital
Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3 (2001).
33. See The Death Penalty in New York: To Examine the Future of Capital Punishment in New
York State: Hearing Before the Assemb. Standing Comm. on Codes, Assemb. Standing Comm. on the
Judiciary, and Assemb. Standing Comm. on Correction, 2004 Leg., 108th Sess. (N.Y. 2004), available
at http://nysl.nysed.gov/Archimages/75782.PDF [hereinafter 2004 New York Public Hearing]
(statements of Bill Pelke and Kate Lowenstein). "[T]he death penalty has absolutely nothing at all to do
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before an execution takes place34 and the brutalization it represents perpetuates the
pain caused by the original acts of the executed prisoner. 35  Victims' families,
individually and through organizations, vehemently deny the "closure" that
execution is presumed to achieve.36 Life in prison without parole accomplishes the
same incapacitation as capital punishment. Prosecuting a death penalty case is
with [] healing . . . in fact it just continues that cycle of violence and it creates more murder victim
family members." Id. at 164 (quoting Pelke). "The death penalty does not honor our murdered family
members.... It feeds our feelings of revenge, anger and hatred and holds out to us an illusionary form
of healing and what we are told will be closure. By now I hope you all know not to offer closure to a
victim's family members. There is no closure." Id. at 171-72 (quoting Lowenstein).
34. The "death row phenomenon" refers to the fact that in the United States, appeals of death
sentences often take decades or more to be finally resolved. It has been argued that this phenomenon is
itself an independent violation of the Eighth Amendment. In Knight v. Florida, Justice Thomas stated,
"I am unaware of any support in the American constitutional tradition or in this Court's precedent for
the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral procedures
and then complain when his execution is delayed." Knight, 120 S. Ct. 459, 459 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). "[I]n most cases raising this novel claim, the delay in carrying out the prisoner's execution
stems from this Court's Byzantine death penalty jurisprudence ... Id. "Inmates have argued that
general prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment. U.S. courts have decided these cases
differently, but no court has held that the general conditions on death row constitute cruel and unusual
punishment." Florencio J. Yuzon, Conditions and Circumstances of Living on Death Row-Violative of
Individual Rights and Fundamental Freedoms?: Divergent Trends of Judicial Review in Evaluating the
'Death Row Phenomenon,' 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 39, 62-63 (1996) (citations omitted).
"Condemned death row inmates rarely succeed at challenging their conditions on death row as cruel and
unusual punishment." Id. at 63. "In People v. Chessman, . . . the defendant was convicted of seventeen
felonies including first degree robbery and kidnapping and was sentenced to death. Chessman spent
eleven years in San Quentin prison awaiting his execution. On appeal, Chessman argued that the length
of his confinement constituted 'cruel and unusual punishment.' Although conceding that 'it [was] ...
in fact unusual that a man should be detained for more than 11 years pending execution of sentence of
death and . . . that mental suffering attends such detention,' the court found that California had not
violated Chessman's Eighth Amendment rights." Id at 69 (citations omitted). "Other recent case law
indicates that courts will not find an Eighth Amendment violation where the inmate abuses the appeals
process, thereby prolonging his time on death row." Id. at 70.
35. See 2004 New York Public Hearing, supra note 33 (discussing victim family testimony).
36. Id. at 172.
37. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. at 1547 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("While incapacitation may have
been a legitimate rationale in 1976, the recent rise in statues providing for life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole demonstrates that incapacitation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient justification
for the death penalty."). Footnote 10 of this concurring opinion points out that as of the writing of
Baze, forty-eight states had "some form of life imprisonment without parole. . . ." Id. at n. 10. See also
A Matter of Life and Death: The Effect of Life-Without-Parole Statutes on Capital Punishment, 119
HARV. L. REv. 1838, 1841-44 (2006) (discussing increase in life without parole statutes); Andrew
Welsh-Huggins, Ohio Prosecutors Using New Life Without Parole Option, AKRON BEACON J., June 23,
2008, available at http://www.moabolition.org/docs/Archives/OH6-08.doc (documenting use of life
without parole as sentencing option). Public Defender Tim Young stated "If you can come to a life
without parole option without having to go through that cost [of a death penalty trial at over $100,000
per initial trial] and it satisfies the public's need for safety and punishment, then that makes a real
reasonable outcome for everyone involved." Id. A 2005 law in Ohio allows prosecutors to seek a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole without first seeking the death penalty. Id. Even a state
like Texas has recently provided the alternative of life without parole to seeking the death penalty in
certain cases. Id. In part because of the new Ohio law, the number of death penalty indictments sought
statewide dropped 32% from 2004 to 2007. Id.
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vastly more expensive than bringing a non-capital charge.38 Overlaying, and
probably overshadowing, these flaws in the system is the profound presence of
innocence. A steady stream of exonerations of death row inmates has obliterated
the illusion of certainty of guilt that most Americans insist must exist to justify
capital punishment.39
Perhaps because of these many problems, data from the Death Penalty
Information Center suggests a retreat from the death penalty over the past decade
that seems to accelerate each year. Both numbers of executions and death
sentences imposed in the United States have steadily declined. In 1999 executions
peaked at 98.40 Between 2005 and 2007, executions totaled 60, 53, and 42
respectively. 41 Prior to the 2008 moratorium on executions imposed by the U.S.
Supreme Court during the pendency of Baze v. Reese and a decision on the "lethal
cocktail" method of execution, 13 death sentences were carried out.42 Since the
Court's approval of that method in April, 2008, 9 additional executions were
carried out as of mid-July, 2008.43
38. See DPIC, Costs of the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs-death-penalty
(last visited Feb. 25, 2009) (discussing high costs of capital punishment); see also JOHN ROMAN ET AL.,
URBAN INSTITUTE, JUSTICE POLICY CENTER, THE COST OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN MARYLAND
(2008), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/CostsDPMaryland.pdf. The average cost of death
penalty prosecution in Maryland is $1.9 to $3 million dollars more than a non-capital punishment
prosecution. Id. at 2. Total cost for 5 executions since 1978 was $186 million or $37.2 million per
execution. Id. at 3. See also NATASHA MINSKER, THE HIDDEN DEATH TAX: THE SECRET COSTS OF
SEEKING EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA (Claire Cooper & Elise Banducci, eds., American Civil Liberties
Union), available at http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal justice/death_penalty/the hidden
death tax.pdf (reporting death penalty costs). California's capital trials cost $1.1 million more than
non-capital trials, and the state spends $117 million more per year to prosecute death penalty cases
rather than seeking life without parole. Id. at 1-2.
39. See DPIC, Innocence: List of Those Freed From Death Row,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row (listing 130 individuals
exonerated since 1973). DPIC estimates that 130 death row inmates in 26 states have been exonerated.
Id. This figure amounts to an approximate innocence rate of 1 out of 10 death sentences imposed. Id.
See generally ALAN W. CLARKE & LAURELYN WHITT, THE BITTER FRUIT OF AMERICAN JUSTICE:
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC RESISTANCE TO THE DEATH PENALTY 113-33 (Northeastern Univ.
Press 2007) (providing comprehensive discussion of innocence cases). The Court has yet to
acknowledge that an innocent death row inmate has been executed. See RICHARD C. DEITER, DPIC,
INNOCENCE AND CRISIS IN THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY (DPIC 2004), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-crisis-american-death-penalty (reporting on innocence
in death penalty cases). See also DPIC, infra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing public opinion
regarding death penalty and innocence).
40. See DPIC Facts, supra note 6 (detailing death penalty executions by year).
4 1. Id
42. See DPIC, The Death Penalty in 2007: Year End Report 3 (2007), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/2007YearEnd.pdf [hereinafter DPIC Year End Report 2007] (noting
"profound effect" of Baze in temporarily placing all executions on hold). Executions were on hold in
seven states, including Illinois, New Jersey, New York, California, Delaware, Maryland, and Nebraska.
DPIC, Death Penalty in Flux (2007), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-flux (last updated
Jan. 22, 2009). The DPIC reports that executions have resumed in the United States and that 24
additional executions were carried out in 2008, totaling 37. See DPIC, Facts about the Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (documenting executions by year).
43. See DPIC, Executions Since Supreme Court's Upholding of Lethal Injections,
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A similar pattern is seen in numbers of death sentences imposed. For the
three years covering 2005 through 2007, these sentences fell from 138 to 121 to
115 .44 Preliminary figures for 2008 have further decreased to 111.45 The current
death row population still remains high at approximately 3300.46 Death sentencing
and execution continue to be heavily concentrated in the Southern parts of the
United States. Texas dominates these statistics with over 60% of all executions in
2007 occurring in that state.47
Many states are backing away from capital punishment. Most compelling is
the State of New Jersey's legislative abolishment of the death penalty in 2007.48
This followed New York's refusal, in 2005 and 2006, to restore capital punishment
in the state after procedural provisions of its law were struck down by the New
York Court of Appeals on state constitutional grounds. 49 Abolitionist efforts in
several states made progress at the legislature level but did not result in signed
laws.5 Numerous states have formed commissions to study death practices in
those states with a view towards restriction or repeal.5 1  These trends are
counterbalanced by the relatively aggressive use of the death penalty by the United
12States Government, especially in the area of terrorism.
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-supreme-courts-upholding-lethal-injection (last visited Sept. 26,
2009) (documenting executions by year).
44. See DPIC, Facts about the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/
FactSheet.pdf.
45. Id.
46. Id. As of January 1, 2008, there were a total of 3,309 inmates on death row in the United
States. Id.
47. Id. For example, in 2008, out of the total of 37 executions in the United States, 35 were
carried out in Texas, Virginia, Oklahoma, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Kentucky.
Id.
48. See DPIC Year End Report 2007, supra note 42, at 1; N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:11-3 (2007)
(abolishing death penalty by amendment).
49. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 357-58. (N.Y. 2004) (holding that the "deadlock
instruction" provision of the New York death penalty statute is unconstitutional under New York's
constitution); see generally, Russell G. Murphy, People v. Cahill: Domestic Violence and the Death
Penalty Debate in New York, 68 ALBANY L. REV. 1029 (2005) (analyzing New York death penalty
law).
50. See DPIC Year End Report 2007, supra note 42 (discussing abolitionist efforts in Nebraska,
New Mexico, Montana, Colorado and Maryland).
51. See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT
119-25 (2008) (describing California's broken and dysfunctional capital punishment system);
MARYLAND COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, FINAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(2008); H.R. 520, 161st Leg. (Nh. 2009) (establishing commission to study death penalty in New
Hampshire).
52. Federal law provides for capital punishment in at least 40 separate statutes and approximately
55 federal inmates are presently on death row. See DPIC, The Federal Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-penalty; see also William Glaberson, U.S. Presents
Charges Against 6 in Sept. 11 Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2008 (noting U.S. seeking death penalty
against Guantanamo detainees in military commission trials); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), S. Res. 735, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted) (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act), H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted); USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R. 3199, 109th Cong. (2006) (enacted);
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Public opinion is exceedingly important in determining the direction of death
penalty law in America. It is often said that Justices of the Supreme Court read the
newspapers-and opinion polls-just like every other citizen! These polls show
that support for capital punishment is holding steady but beginning to shift. A
2007 Gallup poll showed that approximately 69% of Americans supported the
death penalty in the abstract.53 However, when given a choice between death and
life in prison without parole, 48% chose life in prison to 47% for capital
punishment.54 Only 38% of those polled thought that the death penalty was a
deterrent to murder or other serious crimes. Significantly, the highly publicized
exoneration of numbers of capital criminals, and the growing sense that it is highly
likely that innocent prisoners have been executed, is rapidly eroding support for
the death penalty. As many as 60% of a polled group said that evidence of
wrongful convictions lessened their support for, or strengthened their opposition
to, capital punishment.56
Innocence is the magnet that draws together all of the other criticisms of the
death penalty. Since 1973 and the restoration of capital punishment in the United
States, the Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC) estimates that approximately
130 prisoners in 26 states have been released from death row because of evidence
of their innocence. The grounds for these exonerations differ from case to case
DNA evidence (a small percentage of cases); proof of police (coerced confessions)
or prosecutorial (suppression of evidence) misconduct; confessions by the real
killer; and ineffective assistance of counsel.58 From 2000 through 2007 these
USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, S. Res. 2271, 109th Cong.
(2006) (enacted) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Terrorist Death Penalty Enhancement Act of
2005, H.R. 3060, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced June 24, 2005).
53. GALLUP, 2007 GALLUP POLL: DEATH PENALTY (2007), available at
http://www.gallup.conVpoll/1606/Death-Penalty.aspx; RICHARD C. DIETER, A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE:
AMERICANS' DOUBTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (Death Penalty Info. Ctr. 2007).
54. Id.
55. DPIC Year End Report 2007, supra note 42, at 3. This is based on a poll conducted by RT
Strategies and sponsored by DPIC. Id.
56. Id.
57. See DPIC, Innocence and the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-
death-penalty (last visited Feb. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Innocence and the Death Penalty] (discussing
innocence issue and the death penalty).
58. See DPIC, DPIC Summary: The Innocence Protection Act of 2004,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/1322 (last visited Feb. 25, 2009) (summarizing Innocence
Protection Act of 2004); see also RICHARD C. DIETER, INNOCENCE AND THE CRISIS IN THE AMERICAN
DEATH PENALTY (Death Penalty Info. Ctr. 2004) [hereinafter Innocence and the Crisis Report]
(discussing innocence, exonerations, and death penalty). The story of Ryan Matthews provides an
excellent example. At age 17, Matthews was arrested for the murder of a convenience store owner.
Matthews' court-appointed attorney was ill prepared for the case, especially with regard to the DNA
evidence and testing that was required. Despite not fitting the description of the assailant provided by
witnesses and several hours of jury deadlock, the judge ordered additional deliberations until a verdict
was reached. A single hour later, Matthews was convicted and later sentenced to death. After four
years on death row, Matthews' attorneys properly retested the DNA evidence, excluding Matthews, and
discovered evidence previously suppressed by the prosecution. Matthews was officially exonerated in
August 2004. See Innocence and the Crisis Report, supra (providing examples of exonerations).
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exonerations have increased to an average of slightly more than 5 per year.59 It is
understandable, then, that long-time supporters of capital punishment are changing
their opinions.
These profound misgivings in the United States over the death penalty mirror
an established international rejection of capital punishment.60  When diverse
nations and communities come together to condemn a government practice like the
death penalty, policy makers are compelled to recognize the trends. It is in this
environment that international law influences on U.S. Supreme Court death penalty
decisions become more understandable.
PART III. TIE INTERNATIONAL SCENE (AND THE ISOLATION OF THE UNITED
STATES)
Part I of this article noted that the Supreme Court has acknowledged in many
decisions that individual Justices may make their own personal assessments of
what "evolving standards of decency" require under the Eighth Amendment and
whether a particular form of capital punishment significantly advances any of the
"penalogical justifications" for the death penalty.61 The flexibility, and
subjectivity, of such judgments make it possible for international law, foreign court
decisions, and global political activity to influence a Justice's decision in a death
penalty case. International law is strongly anti-death penalty, as illustrated by the
following summary of the status of capital punishment world-wide.
The most universally accepted international condemnation of the death
penalty comes from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and its Second Optional Protocol.62 They provide:
ICCPR (1976) Part III Article 6 (1) Every human being has the
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his life. (2) In countries that have not
abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for
the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time
of the commission of the crime . . . (5) Sentence of death shall not be
imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age
and shall not be carried out on pregnant women. Article 10 (1) All
persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.63
Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR (1991) Article 1 (1) No one within
the jurisdiction of a State Party to the present Protocol shall be executed.
59. Innocence and the Death Penalty, supra note 58.
60. See infra notes 63-93 and accompanying text (discussing international death penalty trends).
61. See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text (discussing judicial discretion in death penalty
decisions).
62. International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights art. 6, entered into force Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil &
Political Rights, Aiming at Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp.
No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Dec. 15, 1989) [hereinafter Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR].
63. ICCPR, supra note 62, at art. 6.
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(2) Each State party shall take all necessary measures to abolish the
death penalty within its jurisdiction. 4
Similar restrictions can be found in the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child,65 The American Convention on Human Rights,66 and the African Charter on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child.67 Especially important is Protocol No. 6 to
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (1985).
Considering that the evolution that has occurred in several member
States of the Council of Europe expresses a general tendency in favour
of abolition of the death penalty. Article 1. The death penalty shall be
abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed.
Article 2. A State may make provision in its law for the death penalty in
respect of acts committed in time or war or of imminent threat of war. .
68
Pursuant to these various provisions, much of the world has freed itself from
the burdens and costs, moral and material, of capital punishment. Based on data
from the Death Penalty Information Center, at the beginning of 2008 an estimated
135 countries had abolished the death penalty either in law or practice. 69  By
comparison, 59 still retained capital punishment. 70 Because the European Union
conditions membership on banning the death penalty,71 and based on the fact that
64. Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 1.
65. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1456
(1989) [hereinafter CRC].
66. American Convention on Human Rights art. O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, art. 4, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (July 18, 1978).
67. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art 5, entered into force Nov. 29, 1999,
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49.
68. Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, E.T.S./114 (Mar. 1, 1985); see also Protocol No. 13 to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, E.T.S. No. 187 (Jan. 7,
2003). The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was
the first legally binding international treaty to ban capital punishment in all circumstances and without
exceptions and is currently ratified by 41 countries. Amnesty International, Death Penalty: Ratification
of International Treaties, http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/ratification-of-international-treaties
(last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
69. See DPIC, The Death Penalty: An International Perspective, Abolitionist and Retentionist
Countries, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries (last visited Feb. 25,
2009); see also, Amnesty International, Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries (last visited Feb. 25,
2009).
70. Amnesty International, supra note 69. On June 16, 2008, the Council of the European Union
issued a statement reaffirming its goal of "working towards universal abolition of the death penalty"
and identified that goal as an "integral objective of the EU's human rights policy" Press Release,
President Dimitrij Rupel, General Affairs and External Relations for the Council of the European Union
(June 16, 2008). The statement lauded the vote of the UN General Assembly that called for a
moratorium on executions world-wide and noted that abolition "contributes to the enhancement of
human dignity and the progressive development of human rights." Id.
71. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 66, at 12; see also European Commission
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all 46 nations of the Council of Europe have stopped executions (40 member
countries ratified Protocol No. 6),72 Europe (with the exception of Belarus) is now
a no-execution zone covering 800 million people. 73
At the present time, approximately 27,500 prisoners are on death row
worldwide.74 For the past few years, the top executing countries were China, Iran,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United States.75 Other active practitioners of
capital punishment included Sudan, Yemen, Vietnam, Mongolia, Jordan and
Singapore.76 In 2006, there were 1591 executions, down 25% from 2005." For
2007, executions decreased an additional 22% to 1252.' During the same year, a
minimum of 3347 death sentences were imposed as compared to 3861 for 2006.79
Obviously, these figures are only estimates, but they suggest a global trend away
from the death penalty.
Other international developments in 2007 reinforce this view. Rwanda voted
to abolish the death penalty;o France amended its constitution to ban capital
punishment;" the Third World Congress Against the Death Penalty was held in
Paris;8 2 and the EU and Council of Europe observed the "European Day Against
the Death Penalty."83 Of critical importance, in an unprecedented act of unity on
the issue, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for a
global moratorium on executions.84 The vote was 104 in favor, 52 opposed, and 29
abstaining." The United States voted "no." The resolution commits signatory
countries to: (1) progressively restrict the use of the death penalty and reduce the
number of offences for which it may be imposed; (2) establish a moratorium on
on External Relations, EU Policy on the Death Penalty, www.ec.europa.eu/external _relations/
human rights/adp/index.htm#pol (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
72. CLARKE & WHITT, supra note 39, at 7.
73. Id.
74. Amnesty International, Death Penalty: Death Sentences and Executions in 2007, http://www.
amnesty.org /en/death-penalty/death-sentences-and-executions-in-2007 (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
75. DPIC, The Death Penalty: An International Perspective, Executions Around the World,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-intemational-perspective (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
76. Id.
77. DPIC, International News and Developments: 2007, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/node/2256 (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
78. DPIC, International: Amnesty International Reports Worldwide Drop in Executions,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/2354 (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
79. Amnesty International, Death Penalty: Death Sentences and Executions in 2007,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/death-sentences-and-executions-in-2007 (last visited Mar. 2,
2009); Amnesty International, Death Penalty: Death Sentences and Executions in 2006,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT50/004/2007/en/dom-ACT500042007en.html (last visited
Mar. 2, 2009).





85. Id. Italian Premier Romano Prodi called for a worldwide moratorium on the death penalty:
we shall perform a great political act through the adoption of this resolution. It will demonstrate that
humankind isn't capable of making progress only in science but also in the field of ethics." Id.
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executions in each country with a view to abolishing the death penalty worldwide;
and (3) not reintroduce capital punishment once it is abolished.86
The action of the United States in voting not to join much of the civilized
world in eliminating capital punishment is representative of its approach to
numerous human rights issues. On the death penalty alone, the United States
steadfastly refused to join the ban on executing juveniles imposed by the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 7  It took a reservation to the ICCPR
protecting its right to continue executions" and declined to sign the Second
Optional Protocol.8 9 America refused to accept the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court 90 and withdrew from the jurisdiction of one of the most important
human rights tribunals in the world, the International Court of Justice. 91 The
United States has shown nothing but disdain for the human rights concerns of the
world community by unilaterally deciding to go to war in Iraq, allowing the use of
torture at Guantanamo Bay, seeking the death penalty for terrorists like Khalid
Sheik Mohammed who were "waterboarded," narrowly reading the Geneva
Convention and exhibiting isolationist "cowboy diplomacy."92 The Supreme
Court's recent 5 to 4 decision in Boumediene v. Bush, granting habeas corpus
rights to Guantanamo detainees, highlights America's continuing isolation on
human rights issues. 93
86. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Landmark Text Calling for
Moratorium on Death Penalty, U.N. Doc. GA/10678 (Dec. 18, 2008) (discussing resolution placing
moratorium on death penalty).
87. CRC, supra note 65, art. 37. The United States has never ratified the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child and refused to recognize its ban on the death penalty for
juveniles. Id.
88. See supra text accompanying note 64; ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 6(5) (prohibiting capital
punishment for anyone under 18 at the time of offense). The ICCPR is signed and ratified by the
United States subject to a reservation regarding Article 6(5). United Nations Treaty Collection, Status
of Treaties, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United States Declarations and
Reservations, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-4&chapter-
4& lang=en#EndDec.
89. Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 62; United Nations Treaty Collections, Status
of Treaties, Participants to the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src= TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-12&chapter-4&lang=en.
90. See Peter Malanczuk, The International Criminal Court and Landmines: What are the
Consequences of Leaving the U.S. Behind, 11 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 77 (2000) (evaluating U.S. rejection
of International Criminal Court).
91. Letter from Condoleezza Rice to the United Nations Secretary General (Mar. 7, 2005),
available at http://www.discourse.net/archives/2005/03/us-announces-withdrawal-from-consular
convention.html (stating that "the United States of America . . . hereby withdraws from . . ." the
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes arising under the Vienna
Convention and that, as a result, "the United States will no longer recognize the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice reflected in that Protocol") [hereinafter U.S. Withdrawal Letter]; see
Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at AO1.
92. See Stephanie Bellier, Unilateral and Multilateral Preventive Self-Defense, 58 ME. L. REV 508
(2006); Lord Hacking, The Rule of Law Papers, 43 INT'L LAW 3 (2009); Jordan J. Paust, The Absolute
Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate Sanctions, 43 VAL U. L. REV. 1535 (2009).
93. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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Today, the commands of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
Articles 3 and 5, that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and the security of
the person" and "[n]o one shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment . . ." have greater meaning than when the Declaration was adopted in
1948.94 Except in the United States!
PART IV. THE JUSTICES DEBATE
International law can influence American policy on capital punishment only
to the extent that it is weighed, considered, and utilized by policy-makers at all
levels. Part V of this Article firmly demonstrates that international law has had a
direct and substantial impact on death penalty decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. 95 A full understanding of the opinions behind those decisions is
aided by an examination of a fascinating and very public debate that has been
occurring among Justices of the Court over the permissibility and propriety of
relying on international law in U.S. constitutional interpretation. The "winner" of
this debate will greatly affect the direction of American death penalty law for years
to come.
The constitutional principles that govern Eighth Amendment death penalty
analysis frame this Justices debate. A significant group on the Supreme Court has
accepted the notion that Justices can, and must, make their own independent
personal determinations of what "evolving standards of decency" in a "maturing
society" require in constitutional terms. 96  The Court must make the same
assessment on whether a particular form of capital punishment "advances one of
the penological justifications" for the death penalty.97 While consistently
acknowledging that international law is not "binding" on the Court,98 public
statements by at least four Justices reveal an openness to looking at world opinion
and policy when deciding Eighth Amendment death penalty cases.99 Two other
Justices have made it equally clear that they passionately reject such an
approach. 100 The debate is, then, fundamentally over the proper role of a Supreme
Court Justice and appropriate theories of constitutional interpretation.101
94. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 3-5, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
95. See infra Part V (discussing international law's impact on U.S. Supreme Court cases).
96. See supra text accompanying note 17 (outlining Eighth Amendment judicial discretion).
97. See supra text accompanying note 21 (discussing judicial discretion in death penalty law).
98. See infra text accompanying note 119 (noting international law not binding on Supreme Court
constitutional cases).
99. See infra text accompanying notes 102, 107, 117, 118, 119, 129, 130, 132, 133, 138, 139, 143,
144 (citing use of international law).
100. See infra notes 103, 121-23, 131, 136-36, 142, 162-62 and accompanying text (discussing
views of Justices Scalia and Thomas on inappropriateness of citing to international law). Chief Justice
Roberts seems to share these attitudes. "[In] [f]oreign Law, you can find anything you want. If you
don't find it in the decisions of France or Italy, it's in the decisions of Somalia or Japan or Indonesia or
wherever. . .. [L]ooking at foreign law for support is like looking out over a crowd and picking out
your friends. You can find them. They're there. And that actually expands the discretion of the judge.
It allows the judge to incorporate his or her own personal preferences, cloak them with the authority of
precedent--because they're finding precedent in foreign law--and use that to determine the meaning of
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The views of Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen
Breyer, and John Paul Stevens can be found in books, magazines, law review
articles, speeches, public forums, and, of course, individual opinions. This group
loosely shares a decision-making methodology that can be called "organic
evolutionism" - a belief that the United States Constitution is a living, growing
document, whose broad language was intended by its Framers to adapt to changing
and unforeseeable social and political conditions in the United StateS. 102 Their
outspoken opponents, Justices Anton Scalia and Clarence Thomas, are
"originalists" or "strict constructionists" who believe that Justices are bound by the
literal text of constitutional provisions supplemented only by the understandings
and intentions of the Founding Fathers at the time of ratification. 103  Their
positions are found in similar sources.
Unusual insights into the thinking and philosophies of these Justices were
provided in a 2005 public discussion between Justices Breyer and Scalia at
American University's Washington College of Law. Their debate, published as
"The Relevance of Foreign Law Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A
Conversation Between Justice Anton Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer,"1 04
the Constitution. And I think that's a misuse of precedent, not a correct use of precedent." See Court in
Transition; 'I Believe That No One Is Above the Law Under Our System', N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at
A26 (listing excerpts from Senate Judiciary Committee's hearing on the nomination of Judge John G.
Roberts, Jr.) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearings]; 151 Cong. Rec. S10.172 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2005)
(statement of Justice Roberts during testimony at confirmation hearing).
101. Some have termed this a debate over "constitutional comparativism." This concept considers
justifications for using foreign and international law in terms of philosophies of judging, theories of
constitutional interpretation (originalism, natural law, majoritarianism, and pragmatism), and political
sovereignty (whether use of international law removes courts from our system of "self-government
founded on democracy and popular sovereignty"). Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S.
Constitution, 131 POL'Y REV. 33 (2005); See Roger Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional
Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639 (2005).
102. See Lisa K. Parshall, Embracing the Living Constitution: Justice Anthony M Kennedy's Move
Away from a Conservative Methodology of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 25, 29
(2007) (characterizing the Constitution as living document). The "Living Constitution" is a metaphor
for an organic view of the Constitution as a document that is always evolving in meaning and adapting
to contemporary values and practices. Id. at 29. The "Living Constitution" approach to interpretation
allows judges to "go beyond ... the four corners of the document." Id. (quoting JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (1980)).
103. See generally JAMES B. STAAB, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JUSTICE ANTON SCALIA: A
HAMILTONIAN ON THE SUPREME COURT (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006) (referring to
proponents of this school as originalists or strict constructionalists); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Multi-
Valenced Constitutional Interpretation and Constitutional Comparisons: An Essay in Honor of Mark
Tushnet, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 599 (2008) (describing originalist view). Originalist interpretation is
focused on "the text of the written Constitution as it was understood at the moment of adoption or
amendment, or on atextual but specific-in-time 'constitutional moments."' Vicki C. Jackson, Multi-
Valenced Constitutional Interpretation and Constitutional Comparisons: An Essay in Honor of Mark
Tushnet, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 606, 606 (2008). Originalism is also defended as necessary to
constrain judges from acting on their own preferences by tying their hands, interpretively, to the
original understanding of the Constitution's text. Id. at 608. "[O]riginalist interpretation is a highly
plausible if not a necessary means of promoting democratic legitimacy." Id.
104. The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation
Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005)
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symbolizes a much broader controversy over judicial functioning that has been part
of American political conversation for some time and that reemerged in the 2008
presidential election campaign.10 5
This Article urges in its Conclusion that the issue of capital punishment
should have been forced into the 2008 elections. 106 The views of a new President
have great potential to affect the decisions of state legislatures and Congress on
future capital punishment policies. The alternative is that, without political action,
the difficult and emotional issues raised by capital prosecutions will continue to be
decided by the Supreme Court. In this context, the subjective beliefs of the
Justices set forth below, about the importance of international law, foreign court
decisions, and world opinion in death penalty and related constitutional cases, will
be critical to the Court's decisions.
A good starting point for this analysis is a speech given by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg in 2006 to South African judges and lawyers. In it she observed:
The notion that it is improper to look beyond the borders of the United
States in grappling with hard [constitutional] questions ... [is in line
with the view that] the US Constitution [is] a document essentially
frozen in time as of the date of its ratification. I am not a partisan of that
view. US jurists honour the Framers' intent "to create a more perfect
Union," . . . if they read the Constitution as belonging to a global 21st
century, not as fixed forever by 18th-century understandings.107
[hereinafter A Conversation Between Scalia and Breyer]; see Anderson, supra note 101, at n. 8
(warning Breyer and Scalia discussion was "informal and unscripted" and ought not to be
"overinterpreted"). The unusually public nature of the Justices' remarks and the consistency of their
comments with their decisions and reasoning in actual cases suggest that their statements should be
given very significant weight. Anderson acknowledges that the discussion provided a "remarkable
window into the thinking of the two justices ..... Anderson, supra note 101. See also ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES (West 2008);
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005);
CHARLES WYZANSKI, WHEREAS--A JUDGE'S PREMISES: ESSAYS IN JUDGMENT, ETHICS, AND THE LAW
(1965).
105. Presidential Candidates Obama and McCain took traditional partisan positions on judicial
appointments. Obama was seen as promoting an activist judicial philosophy. See ABA Bias; WH
Confirms Judicial Activism Pledge, COMMITTEE FOR JUSTICE BLOG, Mar. 18, 2009,
http://www.committeeforjustice.com/blog/2009/03/aba-bias-wh-confirms-judicial-activism.html
(discussing Obama's views on judicial appointments). Obama remarked that 'the critical ingredient [in
a judicial nominee] is supplied by what is in the judge's heart . . . .' Id. Federal judges must have 'the
empathy, to recognize what it's like to be a young teenage mom [or] poor, or African American, or gay,
or disabled, or old.' Id. McCain supported the strict constructionist point of view. See Klaus Marre,
McCain Lambastes Judicial Activism, THE HILL, May 6, 2008, http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/
1322-mccain-lambastes-judicial-activism (outlining McCain's position on judicial activism). 'I will
look for people in the cast of John Roberts, Samuel Alito, and my friend the late William Rehnquist-
jurists ... who know their own minds, and know the law, and know the difference. . . .' Id. Nominees
must 'understand that there are clear limits to the scope of judicial power, and clear limits to the scope
of federal power.' Id.
106. See infra note 259 and accompanying text (calling for death penalty to be primary issue in
2008 presidential campaign).
107. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind": The Value of a
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Historically, Justice Anthony Kennedy has been a strong adherent of Justice
Ginsburg's approach and an outspoken proponent of using foreign and
international law as an aid in interpreting the U.S. Constitution. He wrote majority
opinions in two cases, Lawrence v. Texas108 and Roper v. Simmons,109 which relied
on international law.
Attorney Jeffrey Toobin, author of the best-selling book about the Supreme
Court, THE NINE,110 and well-known CNN legal commentator, gave some
context to these decisions in his September 2005 New Yorker magazine article
Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law Could Change the
Supreme Court.111 Attorney Toobin's article illustrates nicely how a Justice's
personal experiences can contribute to an internationally-based human rights
jurisprudence.
Mr. Toobin points out that Justice Kennedy worked as an oil rigger in Canada
when he was a teenager, studied at the London School of Economics in college,
became licensed to practice law in Mexico, and served while a judge as the
supervisor of American Territorial Courts in the South Pacific. 112 This assignment
led to extensive travel to Guam, Palau, Saipan, American Samoa, Australia, New
Zealand and Japan.113 Importantly, Justice Kennedy has regularly lived in
Salzburg, Austria, beginning in the summer of 1990, in order to teach in the
McGeorge University (School of Law) summer program at the University of
Salzburg. 114 He has lectured to judges and lawyers in China under the auspices of
the American Bar Association."' He, together with other Justices of the Court,
meets with his counterparts from England and Canada.1 16
Drawing on this experience, Justice Kennedy is said to believe that in
"invoking foreign law the United States Supreme Court sends an implicit message
to the rest of the democratic world that our society shares its values." 17 In
Kennedy's words:
"If we are asking the rest of the world to adopt our idea of freedom, it
does seem to me that there may be some mutuality there, that other
nations and other peoples can define and interpret freedom in a way
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 64(3) CAMBRIDGE L. J. 575, 585 (2005).
[hereinafter "A Decent Respect to the Opinions of[Human]kind"].
108. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
109. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005).
110. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT
(Doubleday 2007).
111. Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law Could Change
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that's at least instructive to us ... 118 We [the Court] have to be aware of
what's going on in the world. Of course, it's not binding on us, but we
can't pretend that it doesn't exist. Today, no lawyer would think of not
telling us how courts around the world have approached the same
question. 119
Although neither Justice Ginsburg nor Justice Kennedy was a participant in
the American University discussion, Justice Scalia, the Court's most recognized
conservative, responded to them through his criticism of Justice Breyer's
willingness to rely on international law in his opinions. 120 Justice Scalia stated, "I
do not use foreign law in the interpretation of the United States Constitution ... If
you told the framers . . . we're to be just like Europe, they would have been
appalled." 121 Later in the debate Justice Scalia observed:
[M]y theory of what to do when interpreting the American Constitution
is to try to understand what it meant, [how it] was understood by ...
society ... when it was adopted. And I don't think it has changed since
then . . . If you have that philosophy . . . foreign law is irrelevant with
one exception: old English law-because phrases like 'due process'. . .
were taken from English law.... 122
Justice Scalia continued:
Justice Breyer [and Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy by inference] [do
not] . . . have my approach. [They apply] the principle . . . that the
Constitution is not static. It doesn't mean what the people voted for
when it was ratified. Rather, it changes from era to era to comport with
. . . 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.' I detest that phrase, because . . . societies don't
always mature. Sometimes they rot.123
For now at least, Justice Scalia is stuck with this "evolving standards" test.
As a result, when deciding death penalty cases he will only use:
The standards of decency of American society-. . . not the standards of
decency of other countries that don't have our background, that don't
have our culture, that don't have our moral views. Of what conceivable
value as indicative of American standards of decency would foreign law
be?....
... The only way in which it makes sense to use foreign law is if you
have a third approach to the interpretation of the Constitution, to wit: 'I
as a judge am not looking for the original meaning of the Constitution,
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See infra notes 123-26, 133, 136,138-39, 142, 144, and accompanying text (detailing Scalia's
comments regarding international law).
121. A Conversation Between Scalia and Breyer, supra note 104, at 521.
122. Id. at 525.
123. Id.
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nor for the current standards of decency of American society; I'm
looking for what is the best answer to this social question in my
judgment as an intelligent person. And for that purpose I take into
account the views of other judges, throughout the world.' 12 4
Such an approach is, to Justice Scalia, totally wrong, and perhaps
impeachable.
Justice Breyer's approach to constitutional interpretation and the use of
international materials is more flexible and practical. "You look around to what's
cited, [and] what's cited is what the lawyers tend to think is useful," 125 and that
often includes foreign law.
In terms of citing foreign law in death penalty cases, Justice Breyer was very
specific in the American University discussion. "Nothing in Blackstone, nothing
in Bracton, nothing even in the law books of King Arthur, says that a judge, in
deciding what constitutes 'cruel and unusual punishment,' must confine his review
to the United States alone or to the United States plus Great Britain."l26 Referring
to his dissent from the denial of certiorari review in Moore v. Nebraska1 27 and
Knight v. Florida,128 cases involving the so-called "death row phenomenon" that
argued that decades-long confinement of death row prisoners prior to their
executions constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment, Justice Breyer made
several basic points:
Breyer: I referred to a decision by the Supreme Court of India [Signh v.
State of Punjab] and one by the Supreme Court of Canada [Kindler v.
Minister ofJustice]. I referred to certain United Nations determinations
... I referred to decisions that went the other way as well. I may have
made what one might call a tactical error in referring to a case from
Zimbabwe [Catholic Commission v. Attorney General]-not the human
rights capital of the world ... [But r]eaching out to those other nations,
reading their decisions, seems useful, even though they cannot
determine the outcome of a question that arises under the American
Constitution. 129
Justice Thomas-disagreeing with me-wrote his own brief opinion
arguing that I could not find American precedent supporting my view,
so I must have looked to Zimbabwe out of desperation. He had a certain
point. [Laughter.] But still, with all the uncertainties involved, I would
rather have the judge read pertinent foreign cases while understanding
that the foreign cases are not controlling. I would rather have the judge
treat those cases cautiously, using them with care, than simply to ignore
124. Id. at 526.
125. Full Written Transcript of Scalia-Breyer Debate on Foreign Law, FREE REPUBLIC, Jan. 13,
2005, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1352357/posts.
126. A Conversation Between Scalia and Breyer, supra note 104, at 527.
127. Moore v. Nebraska, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999).
128. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999).
129. A Conversation Between Scalia and Breyer, supra note 104, at 528.
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them. I would rather hope that judges will exercise proper control,
taking the cases for what they are worth, than have an absolute rule that
says judges may never look at foreign decisions. The fact that I cannot
find any absolute legal prohibition [to doing this]-not even in the laws
of King Arthur-gives me cause for hope. 13 0
The debate continued:
Scalia: [Y]ou can say every other country of the world thinks that
holding somebody for twelve years under sentence of death is cruel and
unusual, but you don't know that these other countries don't have
habeas corpus systems which allow repeated applications to state and
federal court, so that the reason it takes twelve years here is because the
convicted murderer himself continues to file appeals that are
continuously rejected.
In England, before they abolished the death penalty-and by the way,
every public opinion poll in England suggests that the people would like
to retain it, but maybe the judges and lawyers and law students feel
differently about it-before they abolished the death penalty, whenever
it was pronounced the judge pronouncing it would don a little skullcap.
When you saw him reach for the skullcap you knew he was about to
pronounce a sentence of death. And that sentence would be carried out
within two weeks. So that's the reason twelve years seems extraordinary
to them. It's extraordinary because we've been so sensitive to the
problem of an erroneous execution that we allow repeated habeas corpus
applications. I just don't think it's comparable. It's just not fair to
compare the two.
But most of all, what does the opinion of a wise Zimbabwe judge or a
wise member of a House of Lords law committee [Soering v. House of
Lords]-what does that have to do with what Americans believe? It is
irrelevant unless you really think it's been given to you to make this
moral judgment, a very difficult moral judgment. And so in making it
for yourself and for the whole country, you consult whatever authorities
you want. Unless you have that philosophy, I don't see how it's relevant
at all.131
Breyer: Well, it's relevant in the sense I described. A similar kind
of person, a judge, with similar training, tries to apply a similar
document with similar language ('cruel and unusual punishment' or the
like), in a society that is somewhat similarly democratic and protective
of basic human rights. England is not the moon, nor is India. Neither is a
question of 'cruel and unusual punishment' an arcane matter of contract
law where differences in legal systems are more likely to make a major
difference. In fact, ironically in those more specifically legal areas-
130. Id.
131. Id. at 529.
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areas where results are more likely tied to the details of a different legal
environment-references to foreign decisions are likely to prove less
controversial. Indeed, we frequently look at foreign law in such cases,
i.e., technical cases. If in a 'cruel and unusual punishment' case the fact
that everyone in the world thinks one thing is at least worth finding out .
. .(then that is worth looking at). And, if my having the legal power to
do so adds some uncertainty to the law, I believe the legal system can
adjust. That is because the law is filled with uncertainty. Its answers in
difficult cases can rarely be deduced only by means of legal logic from
clear legal rules and a history book. Were the latter possible, I would be
more tempted to agree with your view that a system without reference to
foreign law would better control subjective judicial tendencies. But it is
not. 132
Continuing with the discussion outside the death penalty area, Justice Breyer
cited a First Amendment case involving campaign finance laws and noted that,
again, foreign law was referred to in the briefs:
Breyer: Well, consider [the Bowman case in England]. . . Mrs.
Bowman, I believe, favored the right to life. She is a citizen of Great
Britain. She wished to contribute a small amount of money in the days
prior to an election to print literature that would identify pro-life (or pro-
choice) candidates. And the British law prohibited the making of that
contribution so close to the election date. The European Court of Human
Rights considered her claim that Britain's [campaign contribution] law
violated the freedom of expression guaranteed by the European
Convention of Human Rights. Does that issue not sound familiar? One
argument in Mrs. Bowman's favor was that it was unreasonable to
prohibit her contribution while permitting newspapers to say about the
same thing whenever they wished. Does that argument not sound
familiar?
Why is it unreasonable for me to be curious about how the European
Court dealt with [free speech] arguments. I am not bound by what the
Court said. But why can I not look at it? Why should I not be able, in
my opinion, to refer to what the Court said?
1 3 3
Scalia: Look, I'm not preventing you from reading these cases. 1 3 4
Breyer: Well, isn't that exactly [Laughter.] 13 5
Scalia: I mean, go ahead and indulge your curiosity! Just don't put it in
your opinions! [Laughter.]136
132. Id. at 529-30.
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Justice Scalia used the area of abortion rights to illustrate his approach:
On the question of abortion, as an originalist, I would look at the text of
the Constitution, which says nothing about the subject either way. You
know, both sides would like me to resolve it constitutionally, to say that
the Constitution requires the states to permit abortion, or requires the
states to prohibit it. I look at the text; it says nothing about it. And I look
at 200 years of history; nobody ever thought it said anything about it.
That's the end of the question for me. What good would reading
Canadian opinions do, unless it was my job to be the moral arbiter,
which I don't accept?
I regard the Constitution as having set a floor to what American society
can democratically do. That floor says nothing about abortion. It's not
the job of the Constitution to change things by judicial decree; change is
brought about by democratic legislation. Abortion has been prohibited.
You want to change that? American society thinks that's a terrible
result? Fine. Persuade each other about that, and eliminate the laws
against abortion.
I have no problem with change. It's just that I do not regard the
Constitution as being the instrument of change by letting judges read
Canadian cases and say, 'Yeah, it would be a good idea not to have any
restrictions on abortion.' That's not the way we do things in a
democracy. Persuade your fellow citizens and repeal the laws. Why
should the Supreme Court decide that question? 1 3 7
As the discussion continued, focus shifted to judicial functioning and the
influence of foreign and international law:
Breyer: The last questioner implicitly ask[ed] how I go about my daily
work. My daily job is reading and writing....
What do I read? Contrary to the impressions of some, I do not read the
edicts of Colbert. I read briefs. Those briefs frequently explain law
with which I was not previously familiar, for example Louisiana
property law, highly relevant to interpreting an ERISA provision, which
the California State Bar Association explained beautifully in an amicus
brief.
Those briefs will have to explain foreign law too, and ever more so.
That is because foreign law comes before us ever more frequently in
discovery cases, antitrust cases, EPA cases, NAFTA cases. We shall
have to learn something about foreign law to decide those cases
properly. And the lawyers will have to explain it, separating the more
important from the less important information. If there are important
interesting, and relevant matters of foreign law, the lawyers will point
them out.
137. Id. at 535-36.
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Perhaps I should add something relevant to the more 'newsworthy'
cases, involving capital punishment and the like. No judge believes that
he or she is there to advance a political point of view in respect to such
cases. No judge believes that he or she is there to advance an
ideological point of view. If I find that I reach a result simply because I
think it 'morally good,' then I am not doing my job. I do not mean I am
there to foment evil. [Laughter.] I am there to follow the law. That is
what we all think.
Moreover, each of us applies a framework that can be similarly
described in general terms. We look to a document's text; we consider
history; we consider tradition; we consider precedent; we search for the
value or purpose that underlies the legal text; and we want to know the
consequences of our decision, consequences viewed through the prism
of the value or purpose that underlies the [legal] text. But we do not
necessarily give the same weight to each of these factors. Some of us,
over time, tend to place greater importance on some factors than others.
The differences are differences of emphasis. And it is important not to
overstate them. From your point of view as a law student or even as a
professor or judge or practitioner, the similarities are more important
than the differences. 138
Breyer: I believe that I am interpreting the Constitution of the United
States. If, for example, a foreign court, in a particular decision, had
shown that a particular interpretation of similar language in a similar
document had had an adverse effect on free expression, to read that
decision might help me to apply the American Constitution. That is
what is at issue. To what extent will learning what happens in other
courts help a judge apply the Constitution of the United States. As I
have said, in today's world where similar relevant experience becomes
more and more common we are more likely to learn from other
countries. I doubt that Franklin or Hamilton or Jefferson or Madison or
even George Washington would have thought we cannot learn anything
of value from abroad. 139
Scalia: Can I respond to that?140
Anderson: Please.141
Scalia: You know, it's a Constitution that contains phrases of great
generality such as due process of law. Now if you're following an
originalist approach, you ask, what did the framers believe constituted
due process of law? And if I find something there I don't like, that's too
138. Id. at 536.
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bad; I am chained. Because of my theory of the Constitution, that's what
due process was and that's what it is today, unless you amend the
Constitution. Whereas if you believe 'due process of law' is an
invitation for intelligent judges and lawyers and law students to imagine
what they consider to be due process and consult foreign judges, then,
indeed, you do not know what you're saying when you swear to uphold
and defend the Constitution of the United States. It morphs. It
changes. 142
Breyer: I do not often put references to foreign materials in my
opinions. I do so occasionally when I believe that a reference will help
lawyers, specialists, or the public at large better understand the issue or
the views expressed in my opinions. If the foreign materials have had a
significant impact on my thinking, they may belong in the opinion
because an opinion should be transparent. It should reflect my actual
thinking. 143
The debate ended with Justice Breyer concluding:
[The centralizing principle about all exercises of power is that
all] power has to flow from the people and the people must
maintain checks on its exercise. That is a good thing.
That principle, of course, . . . does not prevent me from
sometimes looking at foreign opinions [and international law]
and on occasion even citing them.14 4
Justice Scalia added: "I think it's fine to conclude on something that we
undoubtedly agree upon" and the audience laughed.145
This controversy is not some intellectual or academic exercise. In her speech
in South Africa, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg pointed out that after Roper v.
Simmons was decided in March of 2005, the Marshal of the Supreme Court
advised her and Justice O'Connor of the following web posting:
Okay commandoes, here is your first patriotic assignment . . . an easy
one. Supreme Court Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor have publicly
stated that they use [foreign] laws and rulings to decide how to rule on
American cases.
This is a huge threat to our Republic and Constitutional freedom . . . If
you are what you say you are, and NOT armchair patriots, then those
two justices will not live another week. 146
142. Id.
143. Id. at 540.
144. Id. at 541
145. Id.
146. "A Decent Respect to the Opinions of[Human]kind," supra note 107, at 582.
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Justice John Paul Stevens and Chief Justice John Roberts have not directly
entered this debate. However, the Chief Justice made his views on the use of
foreign law materials quite clear during his confirmation hearings:
[In] [floreign law, you can find anything you want. If you don't find it
in the decisions of France or Italy, it's in the decisions of Somalia or
Japan or Indonesia or wherever ... [L]ooking at foreign law for support
is like looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends. You can
find them. They're there. And that actually expands the discretion of
the judge. It allows the judge to incorporate his or her own personal
preferences, cloak them with the authority of precedent-because
they're finding precedent in foreign law-and use that to determine the
meaning of the Constitution. And I think that's a misuse of precedent,
not a correct use of precedent. 147
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Atkins v. Virginia1 48 and, in
striking down the death penalty for crimes committed by the mentally retarded,
cited in a footnote "the world community['s]" disapproval of such practices as
support for the Court's decision. 14 9 In a speech to the American Bar Association in
August of 2005,150 Justice Stevens broadly attacked America's capital punishment
system without expressly referring to international law.1 51 It is possible that Justice
Stevens has moved past the controversy over using international law by concluding
in Baze v. Reese that the death penalty causes the "needless extinction of life,"
makes only "marginal contributions" to the public good, cannot be justified on the
traditional grounds offered to support it, and should therefore be legislatively
abolished.15 2
This description of the Justices debate can conclude with another quotation
from Justice Ginsburg. To her, "respect for 'the Opinions of [Human]kind"'
requires recognition of all rights that are "accepted as an integral part of human
freedom. . . " around the world. She said:
I ... believe [the U.S. Supreme Court] will continue to accord "a decent
Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind" as a matter of comity and in a
spirit of humility. Comity, because projects vital to our well being -
combating international terrorism is a prime example - require trust and
cooperation of nations the world over. And humility because, in Justice
147. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 100, at A26 (discussing Justice Robert's comments during
confirmation hearings).
148. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002).
149. Id. at 316 n.21.
150. Justice John Paul Stevens, U.S. Supreme Court, Address to the American Bar Association,
Thurgood Marshall Awards Dinner Honoring Abner Mikva (Aug. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-06-05.html.
151. See generally James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less is Better: Justice Stevens and
the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1607 (2006) (examining Justice Stevens' death
penalty and criminal law jurisprudence, not mentioning or relying on international or foreign law).
152. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1550 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
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O'Connor's words: "Other legal systems continue to innovate, to
experiment, and to find new solutions to the new legal problems that
arise each day, from which we can learn and benefit." 53
PART V. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON DEATH PENALTY DECISIONS
The basic premise of this Article is that international law and foreign court
decisions have significantly influenced U.S. Supreme Court decision-making in
death penalty cases. The Justices debate outlined in Part IV is one manifestation of
this reality. The examples that follow provide further evidence that Supreme Court
Justices rely on international law as persuasive authority and use it to support their
conclusions in real cases.
A very early illustration of the Court's reliance on international law is Trop v.
Dulles. 154 In 1958, a plurality of the Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment
"cruel and unusual punishments" clause to embrace, as its basic concept, "nothing
less than the dignity of man" as measured by "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing [U.S.] society."155 In ruling that stripping a war
time deserter of American citizenship was an invalid punishment under the Eighth
Amendment, the Court noted that "civilized nations of the world are in virtual
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime."156
The 1977 case of Coker v. Georgia confronted the issue of whether Georgia
could execute a prisoner convicted of raping a 16 year old "woman." 117 Justice
White, speaking for the Court, recognized in a footnote that "it is thus not
irrelevant ... that out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3
retained the death penalty for rape where death did not ensue."158  The Court
followed international practice and prohibited Georgia from executing Coker.
Over 20 years later, in 1999, one of the Court's most aggressive proponents of
consideration of international law, Justice Stephen Breyer, relied extensively on
the laws, court decisions, and practices of nations, in dissenting from the denial of
Court review of a death sentence that raised the issue of whether the Eighth
Amendment prohibited the execution of prisoners who had spent over 19 years1 59
and 24 years 16 0 on death row. This is the so called "death row phenomenon" claim
that making a death row prisoner wait decades or more before the carrying out of a
death sentence is, by itself, unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment.
According to Breyer:
153. "A Decent Respect to the Opinions of[Human]kind," supra note 107, at 591.
154. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-100, 103 (1958).
155. Id. at 100-01.
156. Id. at 102.
157. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
158. Id. at 596 n. 10.
159. Moore v. Nebraska, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999). The defendant had spent 19 years and 4
months on death row. Id.
160. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999). The defendant had spent 24 years and 6 months
on death row. Id.
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A growing number of courts outside the United States-courts that
accept or assume the lawfulness of the death penalty-have held that
lengthy delay in administering a lawful death penalty renders ultimate
execution inhuman, degrading, or unusually cruel. In Pratt v. Attorney
General of Jamaica . . . for example, the Privy Council considered
whether Jamaica lawfully could execute two prisoners held for 14 years
after sentencing. The Council noted that Jamaican law authorized the
death penalty and that the United Nations Committee on Human Rights
has written that "'capital punishment is not per se unlawful under the
[Human Rights] Covenant."' But the Privy Council concluded that it
was an "inhuman act to keep a man facing the agony of execution over a
long extended period of time," and the delay of 14 years was
"shocking," It held that the delay (and presumptively any delay of more
than five years) was "'inhuman or degrading punishment or other
treatment' forbidden by Jamaica's Constitution unless "due entirely to
the fault of the accused."
The Supreme Court of India has held that an appellate court, which
itself has authority to sentence, must take account of delay when
deciding whether to impose a death penalty. Sher Singh v. State of
Punjab, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 465. A condemned prisoner may ask whether
it is "just and fair" to permit execution in instances of "[p]rolonged
delay." The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, after surveying holdings of
many foreign courts, concluded that delays of five and six years were
"inordinate" and constituted "'torture or . . . inhuman or degrading
punishment or other such treatment."' Catholic Commission for Justice
and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, [1993] 1 Zimb. L.R. 239,
240, 269(S) (Aug. 4, 1999) . . . And the European Court of Human
Rights, interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights, noted
the convention did not forbid capital punishment. But, in the court's
view, the convention nonetheless prohibited the United Kingdom from
extraditing a potential defendant to the Commonwealth of Virginia-in
large part because the 6- to 8-year delay that typically accompanied a
death sentence amounts to "cruel, inhuman, [or] degrading treatment or
punishment" forbidden by the convention. Soering v. United Kingdom,
11 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser.A), pp.439, 478, & T 111 (1989).
Not all foreign authority reaches the same conclusion. The Supreme
Court of Canada, for example, held that Canadian constitutional
standards, though roughly similar to those of the European Convention
on Human Rights, did not bar extradition to the United States of a
defendant facing the death penalty. Kindler v. Minister of Justice,
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 838 (joint opinion). And the United Nations
Human Rights Committee has written that a delay of 10 years does not
necessarily violate roughly similar standards set forth in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Views adopted by the United Nations
Human Rights Committee, 44th Sess., Mar. 30, 1992, Inre: Barrett v.
Jamaica (Nos. 270/1988 and 271/1988) § 8.4. Given the closeness of
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the Canadian Court's decision (4 to 3) and language that the United
Nations Human Rights Committee used to describe the 10-year delay
("disturbingly long"), one cannot be certain what position those bodies
would take in respect to delays of 19 and 24 years.
Obviously this foreign authority does not bind us. After all, we are
interpreting a "Constitution for the United States of America."
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868, n.4, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101
L.Ed.2d 702 (1988) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). And indeed, after
Soering, the United States Senate insisted on reservations to language
imposing similar standards in various human rights treaties, specifying,
for example, that the language in question did not "restrict or prohibit
the United States from applying the death penalty consistent with the ...
Constitution of the United States, including any constitutional period of
confinement prior to the imposition of the death penalty." 136 Cong.
Rec. 36192-36199 (1990) (U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and
Consent to Ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment).
Nonetheless, the treaty reservations say nothing about whether a
particular "period of confinement" is "constitutional." And this Court
has long considered as relevant and informative the way in which
foreign courts have applied standards roughly comparable to our own
constitutional standards in roughly comparable circumstances. In doing
so, the Court has found particularly instructive opinions of former
Commonwealth nations insofar as those opinions reflect a legal tradition
that also underlies our own Eighth Amendment. Thompson v.
Oklahoma, supra, at 380-831, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (opinion of STEVENS, J.)
(considering practices of Anglo-American nations regarding executing
juveniles); Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796-797, n.22, 102 S.Ct.
3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (noting that the doctrine of felony murder
has been eliminated or restricted in England, India, Canada, and a
"number of other Commonwealth countries"); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 596, n.10, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (observing
that only 3 of 60 nations surveyed in 1965 retained the death penalty for
rape); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-103, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d
630 (1958) (noting that only 2 of 84 countries surveyed imposed
denationalization as a penalty for desertion). See also Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710, n. 8, and 718-719, n. 16, 117 S.Ct.
2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997) (surveying other nations' laws regarding
assisted suicide); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583-584, n.25,
and 588, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) (considering English
practice concerning police interrogation of suspects); Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 183-189, 26 L.Ed. 377 (1881) (referring to the
practices of Parliament in determining whether the House of
Representatives has the power to hold a witness in contempt).
Willingness to consider foreign judicial views in comparable cases is
not surprising in a Nation that from its birth has given a "decent respect
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to the opinions of mankind."
In these cases, the foreign courts I have mentioned have considered
roughly comparable questions under roughly comparable legal
standards. Each court has held or assumed that those standards permit
application of the death penalty itself. Consequently, I believe their
views are useful even though not binding.
Further, the force of the major countervailing argument is diminished in
these two cases. That argument (as set out by the Human Rights
Commission) recognizes that there must be an "element of delay
between the lawful imposition of a sentence of death and the exhaustion
of available remedies." Barrett, supra, § 8.4. It claims that "even
prolonged periods of detention under a severe custodial regime on death
row cannot generally be considered to constitute cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment if the convicted person is merely availing himself
of appellate remedies." Ibid. As the Canadian Supreme Court noted, "a
defendant is never forced to undergo the full appeal procedure, but the
vast majority choose to do so. It would be ironic if delay caused by the
appellant's taking advantage of the full and generous avenue of the
appeals available to him should be viewed as a violation of fundamental
justice." Kindler, supra, at 838; see also Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d
1473, 1491-1492 (C.A.9 1990).161
Justice Clarence Thomas, the spiritual ally of Justice Scalia, agreed that the
Court should not hear the appeal in these cases and ridiculed Justice Breyer's
references to foreign court decisions.
I write only to point out that I am unaware of any support in the
American constitutional tradition or in this Court's precedent for the
proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of
appellate and collateral procedures and then complain when his
execution is delayed. Indeed, were there any such support in our own
jurisprudence, it would be unnecessary for proponents of the claim to
rely on the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of
Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of India, or the Privy Council. 162
In a follow-up footnote Justice Thomas wrote:
In support of his claim, petitioner Knight cites Blackstone, who
remarked that "a delayed execution 'affects the minds of the spectators
rather as a terrible sight, than as the necessary consequence of
transgression."' Pet. for Cert. in No. 98-9741, p. 15 (quoting 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *397). Blackstone was speaking of the
effect speedy execution would have on deterring crime: "[P]unishment
should follow the crime as early as possible; that the prospect of
gratification or advantage, which tempts a man to commit the crime,
161. Knight, 528 U.S. 990, 995-98 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
162. Id. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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should instantly awake the attendant idea of punishment." Ibid. In this
regard, Blackstone observed that "throughout the kingdom, by statute 25
Geo. II. c. 37. it is enacted that, in case of murder, the judge shall in his
sentence direct execution to be performed on the next day but one after
sentence passed." Ibid. I have no doubt that such a system, if
reenacted, would have the deterrent effect that Justice BREYER finds
lacking in the current system, but I am equally confident that such a
procedure would find little support from this Court. 163
The modem era of the Supreme Court using international law begins with two
cases from the 2002-2003 term of the Court, Atkins v. Virginia1 64 and Lawrence v.
TexaS. 165
Justice John Paul Stevens, in Atkins, found a national and international
consensus against the execution of murderers who were severely mentally retarded
at the time of their crimes. He stated in a footnote that "within the world
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally
retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved."1 66
Lawrence v. Texas dealt with the non-Eighth Amendment issue of whether the
liberty protected by the Constitution's due process clauses protected the right of
same-sex adults to engage in voluntary intimate sexual activity (sodomy), free
from criminal sanctions. 167 In finding such a right, a Court majority joined Justice
Anthony Kennedy's opinion that, for the first time, placed international law at the
center-not in a footnote-of the Court's reasoning. 168 The Court's decision was,
in effect, that Lawrence's claim was consistent with American values that are
shared with much of western civilization, that many "nations have taken action
consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to
engage in intimate, consensual conduct. [And that t]he right . . . [sought] in this
case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other
countries." 169 And, as many would like to see happen with the Furman and Gregg
line of cases, the Court used international law to overturn one of its prior decisions,
Bowers v. Hardwick,170 that had upheld the constitutionality of laws criminalizing
adult homosexual sex.
Justice Kennedy's words ring powerfully today:
The sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger [in Bowers] to the
history of Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical
standards did not take account of other authorities pointing in an
163. Id. at n. 1.
164. See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding capital punishment of mentally
retarded individuals constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and is therefore prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment).
165. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
166. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
167. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
168. Id. at 562, 568, 572-73.
169. Id. at 576-77.
170. See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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opposite direction. A committee advising the British Parliament
recommended in 1957 repeal of laws punishing homosexual conduct.
The Wolfenden Report: Report of the Committee on Homosexual
Offences and Prostitution (1963). Parliament enacted the substance of
those recommendations 10 years later. Sexual Offences Act 1967, § 1.
Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was decided
the European Court of Human Rights considered a case with parallels to
Bowers and to today's case. An adult male resident in Northern Ireland
alleged he was a practicing homosexual who desired to engage in
consensual homosexual conduct. The laws of Northern Ireland forbade
him that right. He alleged that he had been questioned, his home had
been searched, and he feared criminal prosecution. The court held that
the laws [of Northern Ireland] proscribing the conduct were invalid
under the European Convention on Human Rights. Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981) & 52. Authoritative in all countries
that are members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations
now), the decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim
put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization.
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider
civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers
have been rejected elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights has
followed not Bowers but its own decision in Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom. See P. G. & JH. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 00044787/98,
& T 56 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Sept. 25, 2001); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (1993); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988). Other nations,
too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected
right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.
See Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae 11-12. The right the
petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of
human freedom in many other countries. There has been no showing
that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal
choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.17 1
Justice Scalia, in his Lawrence dissent, fired the first loud shot in what is
shown in Part IV of this Article to be an open war among the Justices over the
legitimacy of relying on foreign legal authorities. He protested:
The Bowers majority opinion never relied on "values we share with a
wider civilization," but rather rejected the claimed right to sodomy on
the ground that such a right was not "'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition,"' 478 U.S., at 193-194, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (emphasis
added). Bowers' rational-basis holding is likewise devoid of any
reliance on the views of a "wider civilization," see id., at 196, 106 S.Ct.
171. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77.
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2841. The Court's discussion of these foreign views (ignoring, of
course, the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions on
sodomy) is therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however,
since "this Court . .. should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions
on Americans." Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n., 123 S.Ct. 470, 154
L.Ed.2d 359 (2002) (THOMAS, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).172
Prior to the cases presented in the 2007-2008 Term, the most recent
substantive holding on the meaning of "cruel and unusual" in the death penalty
context came in 2005 in Roper v. Simmons.173 Justice Kennedy's opinion in Roper
found it unconstitutional in all cases to execute murderers who were under the age
of 18 at the time of their crime. In a speech at Cambridge University, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg had this to say about Roper: "Roper v. Simmons presents perhaps
the fullest expressions to date on the propriety and utility of looking to 'opinions of
[human]kind' [in giving meaning to the broad language of our Constitution]."l74
Justice Kennedy's opinion cited extensively to world legal opinion on the
juvenile death penalty, as follows:
Petitioner [the state of Virginia] cannot show national consensus in
favor of capital punishment for juveniles but still resists the conclusion
that any consensus exists against it. Petitioner supports this position
with, in particular, the observation that when the Senate ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), it did so
subject to the President's proposed reservation regarding Article 6(5) of
that treaty, which prohibits capital punishment for juveniles. This
reservation at best provides only faint support for petitioner's argument.
First, the reservation was passed in 1992; since then, five States have
abandoned capital punishment for juveniles. Second, Congress
considered the issue when enacting the Federal Death Penalty Act in
1994, and determined that the death penalty should not extend to
juveniles. The reservation to Article 6(5) of the ICCPR provides
minimal evidence that there is not now a national consensus against
juvenile executions.
Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate [and
unconstitutional] punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation
in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world
that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.
This reality does not become controlling, for the task of interpreting the
Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility. Yet at least from the
time of the Court's decision in Trop, the Court has referred to the laws
172. Id. at 598.
173. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (citation omitted).
174. "A Decent Respect to the Opinions of[Human]kind," supra note 107, at 590.
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of other countries and to international authorities as instructive for its
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and
unusual punishments .... "
As respondent [Atkins] and a number of amici emphasize, Article 37 of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which every
country in the world has ratified save for the United States and Somalia,
contains an express prohibition on capital punishment for crimes
committed by juveniles under 18. No ratifying country has entered a
reservation to the provision prohibiting the execution of juvenile
offenders. Parallel prohibitions are contained in other significant
international covenants. See ICCPR, Art. 6(5); . . . American
Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, Art. 4(5)
[prohibiting capital punishment for anyone under 18 at the time of
offense]; ... African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,
Art. 5(3) ....
Respondent and his amici have submitted, and petitioner does not
contest, that only seven countries other than the United States have
executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and China. Since
then each of these countries has either abolished capital punishment for
juveniles or made public disavowal of the practice. In sum, it is fair to
say that the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its
face against the juvenile death penalty.
It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large
part on the understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of
young people may often be a factor in the crime. The opinion of the
world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide
respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.
Over time, from one generation to the next, the Constitution has come to
earn the high respect and even, as Madison dared to hope, the veneration
of the American people. The document sets forth, and rests upon,
innovative principles original to the American experience, such as
federalism; a proven balance in political mechanisms through separation
of powers; specific guarantees for the accused in criminal cases; and
broad provisions to secure individual freedom and preserve human
dignity. These doctrines and guarantees are central to the American
experience and remain essential to our present-day self-definition and
national identity. Not the least of the reasons we honor the Constitution,
then, is because we know it to be our own. It does not lessen our fidelity
to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the
express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and
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peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within
our own heritage of freedom.175
Not everything at the U.S. Supreme Court level is positive from the
abolitionist perspective. Two of the three substantive death penalty cases on the
Court's 2007-2008 docket, Medellin v. Texasl76 and Baze v. Reese,i17 resulted in
rulings in favor of the death penalty.
Medellin v. Texas is an example of the American government ignoring
international law when it feels that to do so is in the country's best interest. The
United States has taken reservations to major international treaties, disclaiming any
provisions excluded by the reservation;178 withdrawn from the jurisdiction of
international tribunals (e.g., International Court of Justice1 79); for many years
offered a deaf ear to world-wide objections to the execution of juveniles that
ultimately led to Roper v. Simmons)8 o and completely ignored consistent state
violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations."' Regarding the
Vienna Convention, many had hoped that Medellin would remedy this violation of
international law. The Court's March 25, 2008 decision was, therefore, a major
disappointment. 18 2
Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention requires states and the federal
government to advise foreign nationals in U.S. custody on criminal charges of their
right of access to their country's embassy and its officials.183 Plainly, legal advice
from those officials is often crucial to a fair trial for these defendants. Medellin
and other Mexican nationals were not given these rights. Medellin tried to remedy
this violation of the Convention in Texas and lost based on state procedural rules.
During the pendency of Medellin's federal habeas case, Mexico sued the United
States in the International Court of Justice which ordered the United States to
review Medellin's conviction and sentence based on the violations of Article
175. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567, 575-78 (citations omitted).
176. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008); see also Medellin v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 360 (2008)
(denying Medellin's second application for writ of habeas corpus).
177. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1538 (2008).
178. The most notorious reservation may be the U.S. reservation to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights expressly, "reserve[ing] the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to
impose capital punishment on any person ..... United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United States Declarations and Reservations,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg no=IV-4&chapter-4&lang=en#
EndDec.
179. See Letter of March 7, 2005, supra note 91 (noting U.S. withdrawal from I.C.J. jurisdiction);
see also supra text accompanying note 93.
180. The United States has never ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
and refused to recognize its ban on the death penalty for juveniles. See Convention on the Rights of the
Child, supra note 65 (citing U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child).
181. See CLARKE & WHITT, supra note 22, at 54-59 (discussing U.S. noncompliance with Vienna
Convention).
182. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1348 (2008).
183. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No.
6820.
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36(1)(b). 184  President Bush accepted the ICJ's judgment and ordered Texas to
comply.185  Texas refused. 186 When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court it
ruled that the Vienna Convention was not "self-executing" and required Congress
to pass further legislation before the ICJ judgment, or any ICJ ruling, could
become enforceable American law.18 7 As a result, the judgment in the Medellin
case bound only the United States and not individual states. President Bush's
order was thus also unenforceable because the ICJ order did not constitute valid
federal law for purposes of the Supremacy Clause.1 8 8
Medellin could be read, first, as an example of international law having no
direct influence on American death penalty practices. The Supreme Court's
technical decision determined that a judgment and order of the International Court
of Justice against the United States, Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mexico v. United States),18 9 was not enforceable against the State of
Texas.190 In so doing, the Court decided a question of U.S. domestic law-
whether the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 91 and its Optional Protocol
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputesl92 were self-executing for
purposes of enforcement of national law under the Supremacy Clause 93-with
some reference to international law-the Vienna Convention and its Protocol, the
184. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar.
31).
185. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Attorney Gen. (Feb. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter Bush Memorandum]. President Bush determined that the United States would "discharge
its inter-national obligations . . .by having State courts give effect to the [Avena] decision." Id.
186. Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W. 3d 315, 352 (2006).
187. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356-62 (2008). A treaty like the Vienna Convention is
clearly a binding international commitment. It does not, however, become binding domestic U.S. law
unless it is "self-executing" in the sense that it was ratified with the express intention or purpose of
becoming law automatically enforceable within the United States, meaning the treaty must convey the
intention to be self-executing and be ratified on that basis. In the Court's judgment, that was not the
case with ratification of the Vienna Convention. Therefore, Congress needed to pass legislation in
order to enforce the ICJ judgment, which it had not done. "If ICJ judgments were instead regarded as
automatically enforceable domestic law, they would be immediately and directly binding on state and
federal courts pursuant to the Supremacy Clause." Id. The Court took the view that ICJ decisions are
not automatically enforceable as U.S. domestic law because of the enforcement structure established by
Article 94 of the U.N. Charter. Id. Article 94(2) provides an option of noncompliance with ICJ
judgments, allowing political branches to determine whether and how to comply with ICJ decisions.
Noncompliance with an ICJ judgment through the exercise of a Security Council veto has always been
regarded as a viable option by the Executive and Senate after consideration of the U.N. Charter,
Optional Protocol, and ICJ Statute. A "self-executing" judgment would deprive a government of this
option, leading the Court to decide that "there is no reason to believe that the President and Senate
signed up for such a result." Id.
188. Exparte Medellin, 223 S.W. 3d at 352.
189. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar.
31).
190. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1360-61.
191. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No.
6820.
192. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes, art. I., Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 326, 596 U.N.T.S. 487, 488.
193. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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UN Charter, 194 and the originating statute for the ICJ195 -but no direct reliance on
it. The underlying policy concern in the case was respect for international law and,
on that point, the result is at least disappointing, particularly for the death row
inmate parties to the case whose executions will proceed to scheduling. 196
International law did have a tangential influence on the majority decision.
Chief Justice John Roberts' opinion cited the practice of 47 nations that had signed
the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention, and decisions of the 171 countries
that are parties to the Convention, in refusing to treat an International Court of
Justice judgment as self-executing or automatically binding domestic law. 197 "The
lack of any basis for supposing that any other country would treat ICJ judgments as
directly enforceable as a matter of their domestic law strongly suggests that the
treaty should not be so viewed in our courts."1 98 The Court seemed to say "see, we
are just doing what other countries do."
A curious thing about the Medellin decision is that part of the U.S.
government, the President, aggressively undertook to meet the international
obligations imposed by the ICJ judgment. In doing so, he identified important
U.S. interests such as insuring reciprocal compliance with the Vienna Convention,
protecting relations with foreign governments, and demonstrating U.S.
commitment to the role of international law. 199 The President's Memorandum was
a good faith attempt to comply with the ICJ order by bringing pressure on Texas
and other states to support the nation in its efforts to respect and follow
international law. Yet, the Court felt no "separation of powers"200 constraints and
blocked that effort.
194. U.N. Charter art. 94.
195. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 (1945) [hereinafter
ICJ Statute].
196. Based on the March 2008 Supreme Court ruling in Medellin, Texas scheduled Medellin's
execution for August 5, 2008. In response, in June of 2008, Mexico filed with the ICJ a "Request for
Interpretation of Judgment" in the Avena case in which it characterized the actions of President Bush,
the State of Texas, and the Supreme Court as a "fundamental dispute" over the scope and effect of the
Avena judgment. See Press Release, International Court of Justice, Request for Interpretation of the
Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (July 16,
2008) available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14637.pdf. It pointed out that no "review and
reconsideration" of Medellin's death sentence had occurred, as required by Avena, and asked the ICJ to
reaffirm the international law obligations of the United States. Id. at 2-4. On July 16, the ICJ ordered
the United States to 'take all measures necessary to ensure that Messrs. Jos6 Ernesto Medellin Rojas ...
[and the other Mexican nationals subject to the Avena judgment] are not executed pending judgment on
the Request for interpretation submitted by [Mexico] . . . " or judgment on the provision of review and
reconsideration required by the March judgment. Id. at 1. On August 6, 2008, Texas executed Medellin
without any further review of his case. Manuel Roig-Franzia, Mexican National Executed in Texas,
THE WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2008, at A6.
197. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1363. The point is that the Court's approach mirrors that of many
countries in relying on post-ratification understandings of the effect of the Convention and the reach of
ICJ jurisdiction.
198. Id.
199. Bush Memorandum, supra note 185.
200. See Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1369.
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Justice Breyer entered his usual vigorous dissent to the Court's reasoning.
Brief references to the practices of other nations were made (to Great Britain, the
Netherlands, Mexico) 201 but, ultimately, Justice Breyer would have read the
relevant treaties and conventions in a practical way so as to preserve a "workable
dispute resolution"202 procedure that functions effectively by using the Supremacy
Clause to bind states like Texas to an ICJ "compulsory" jurisdictional2 03 judgment.
He observed, "[i]n a world where commerce, trade, and travel have become even
more international ... [refusing enforcement of the Avena judgment] is a step in
the wrong direction." 204  Without self-execution, this treaty and many, many,
others are rendered "useless." 205 Justice Breyer noted the position taken by the
State Department at the time the Consular Relations Convention was ratified that
the "Convention is considered entirely self-executive and does not require any
implementing or complementing legislation"206 and the view of the Executive
Branch that other "indistinguishable" provisions of the Convention were "self-
executing."207 Justice Breyer concluded by noting that "today's holdings make it
more difficult to enforce the judgments of international tribunals, ... [and] weaken
... [the] rule of law for which our Constitution stands."208 His point was driven
home when, subsequent to the Court's Medellin decision, the United States
withdrew from the Optional Protocol and the jurisdiction of the ICJ on matters
involving access to consulates.209
The problems created by Medellin for Americans travelling abroad are
obvious. Why should other countries comply with their Vienna Convention
consular obligations when the United States does not? The situation is comparable
to the problems American adherence to the death penalty creates for extraditing
murderers and terrorists. Dozens of countries now refuse to extradite criminals to
the United States without "assurances" that the death penalty will not be sought
after extradition.210 Obstacles to extradition and outrage over denial of Vienna
201. Id. at 1381, 1386-87 (Breyer J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 1389.
203. Id. at 1383, 1389.
204. Id. at 1389.
205. Id. at 1384.
206. Id. at 1386.
207. Id.; see also Brief for United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (Nos. 05-51 and 04-10566) 2006 WL 271823, p. 14, n.2.
208. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1391. An amicus brief from "International Court of Justice Experts"
urged the Court to find the treaties self executing. See Brief for International Court of Justice Experts
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008), (No. 06-984), 2007
WL 1886207. One of the arguments made was that the essential purpose of the Supremacy Clause was,
and is, to make treaties binding on the States, in order to protect fundamental national powers in foreign
affairs as conferred by Articles I, II and III of the Constitution. Id. at 8-10. The majority is "hunting
the snark"!? See LEWIS CARROLL, THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK (BookSurge Classics 2004)
(1876). Carroll described the "snark" as a creature that could not be described or was "unimaginable."
The unknown or mysterious creature that children could not see, find, or understand. Id.
209. See U.S. Withdrawal Letter, supra note 91 (discussing U.S. withdrawal from Optional
Protocol).
210. See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1;
Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
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Convention rights raise a most compelling question-does America's continuing
commitment to capital punishment as a state policy justify the damage done to our
national security, our reputation in the international community, and our ability to
protect our citizens outside the United States?
Baze v. Reese, 211 decided on April 16, 2008, signaled a return to active
212execution of death row prisoners in the United States. Only two Justices,
Ginsburg and Souter, dissented from the Court's holding Kentucky's "lethal
cocktail" injection method of executing prisoners did not violate the Eighth
Amendment. 13 International law played no major part in the decision, and
probably could not have. But, Justices Alito and Stevens did manage to slip into
the Court's analysis approving references to the practice of the Royal Dutch
Society for the Advancement of Pharmacy of using the same drugs used for
executions in Kentucky to carry out assisted suicides in Holland.214 This may be
contrasted with the fact that the Baze ruling permits use of a drug-pancuronioum
bromide-that veterinarians are prohibited from using in euthanizing animals in
many states! 2 15 In any case, after Baze, it appears that the legal fight over capital
punishment will continue to be over expansion of the death penalty, as illustrated
by Kennedy, rather than over Justice Steven's conclusion, stated in his concurrence
to Baze, that the death penalty is no longer supportable in law or policy and should
therefore be abolished.216
The third and last substantive capital punishment case before the Court in
2007-2008, was Kennedy v. Louisiana.217 The case involved reconsideration of
Coker v. Georgia with reference to a Louisiana law that made rape of a child under
the age of 12 a capital crime. 218 Patrick Kennedy, a 43-year-old black man, was
convicted in a Louisiana state court of raping his eight year old step-daughter.
Under Louisiana law, aggravated rape, defined at the time as sexual relations with
a child under the age of 12,219 was a capital crime and Kennedy was sentenced to
Northern Ireland, U.S.-U.K.-N.Ir., March 31, 2003, Treaty Series No. 13 (2007), available at
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm73/7382/7382.pdf; United States v. Bums, [2001] 1
S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 7 (Can.); Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) (1989); The
United Nations Human Rights Committee, Judge v. Canada: Views of the Human Rights Committee
under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN doc.
CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (Aug. 13, 2003); ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 6; Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Mex.,
May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059; Mohamed v. President of South Africa 2001 (3) S.A. 893(CC) at 16-17
(S.Afr.); State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 49-61, 451 (S. Afr.). All consider prohibiting
extradition to the United States without formal assurances that criminal proceedings will not result in a
death sentence.
211. Baze v. Reese, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 44, 86, 88 (discussing moratoria on executions).
213. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1567 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
214. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1535.
215. Id. at 1524.
216. See supra, text accompanying note 28 (Stevens J., concurring) (calling capital punishment
"the pointless and needless extinction of life").
217. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
218. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
219. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (1998).
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death. He appealed this sentence through state courts and lost.220  He then
appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court arguing that his sentence constituted "cruel
and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution221
and that, as a result, he could not constitutionally be put to death. As Justices
Breyer and Kennedy asked them to do, lawyers for Petitioner Kennedy cited in
their brief updated evidence on international practice on this subject as follows:
International norms reinforce the unacceptability of imposing capital
punishment for child rape. This Court noted in Coker that only three out
of 60 "major nations in the world" allowed the death penalty for any
kind of rape in which death did not result. 433 U.S. at 596 n. 10.
Today, no Western nation authorizes the death penalty for any kind of
rape. Only a sliver of the countries admitted to the United Nations does
so, the most prominent being China, a country that also allows capital
punishment for tax evasion and other economic and nonviolent offenses.
See Br. Amici Curiae of Leading British Law Associations et al.; Peter
D. Nestor, When the Price Is Too High: Rethinking China's Deterrence
Strategy for Robbery, 16 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 525, 538 (2007). The
handful of other countries that Louisiana seeks to have the United States
join in authorizing the death penalty for non-homicide rape include
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which authorize such punishment for reasons
rooted at least partly in the subjugation of women.222
Petitioners elaborated on the issue of subjugating women with the following
footnote:
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, and Jordan, all of
which allow the death penalty for rape, appear to derive their criminal
codes from Shari'a, which also subjects individuals to the death penalty
for blasphemy, apostasy, adultery, prostitution and homosexuality. See,
e.g., Gay Nigerians Face Sharia Death, BBC News, Aug. 10, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/6940061.stm. In some countries,
under Shari'a, survivors of rape are themselves subjected to significant
corporal punishment. See, e.g., Rape Case Calls Saudi Legal System
Into Question, MSNBC, Nov. 21, 2006, http://www.msnbc. msn.com/id/
15836746; Dan Isaacs, Court in Nigeria Spares Woman from Stoning,
Daily Telegraph, Mar. 26, 2002, at 4.223
Since Coker, the United States also has become a signatory to the
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), Article 4(2) of which
provides that the death penalty "shall not be extended to crimes to which
it does not presently apply." ACHR: Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica, Art.
220. Louisiana v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d 757, 793 (La. 2007).
221. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 U.S. 2641 (2008).
222. Brief for the Petitioner at 36-37, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (No. 07-343),
2008 WL 466093.
223. Id. at 37.
INT'L LAW INFLUENCES ON DEATH PENALTY
4(5), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 146 (entered into force July 19,
1978) (cited in Roper, 543 U.S. at 576). Thus, not only does
Louisiana's death penalty for child rape isolate it on both the national
and world stages, but it is at odds with an international treaty.224
When the Kennedy case was argued before the Court on April 16 of 2008,
international law continued to be relevant and important to the appellate process.
This was driven home by questions from two Justices and comments by counsel.
First, as the Petitioner's lawyer tried to argue that the Court had limited
capital punishment to aggravated murder, and that child rape did not rise to a level
of seriousness comparable to murder, Justice Kennedy interrupted to ask "[w]hat
about treason? . . . Even the countries of Europe which have joined the European
Convention on Human Rights ... make an exception ... for treason. You can
slaughter your fellow citizens [in these countries], but if you offend the State you
can be put to death."225 Counsel conceded that treason is regarded in the United
States and around the world as equivalent in seriousness to murder but argued that
this had no bearing on a state's right to expand application of its death penalty
beyond murder because the offense is against the safety and security of the state
itself.226
Later, Justice Stevens, referring to the briefs, suggested that there was a "sort
of correspondence" between international law and our "evolving standards of
decency," and asked how the international trend against expanding capital
227punishment applied to the case. Counsel for Louisiana responded by seemingly
denying such a trend and asserting that approximately 28 countries "permit the
death penalty for rape."228 She argued further that "there are no treaties" in
229existence that would prevent the United States from executing child rapists.
National consensus, then, continued to have an international reference point.
Finally, later in the argument, counsel for Texas asserted that the international
law arguments made in Petitioner Kennedy's brief, quoted above, made the same
types of unacceptable arguments that had been made in Medellin. He
characterized those arguments as suggesting "that this Court has no ability to
determine that . . . [certain crimes are] subject to the death penalty."23 0 Counsel
found the assertions of one amicus brief 31 to be even more outrageous by arguing,
in effect, that "the United States is foreclosed from ever doing this [punishing the
rape of a child with the death penalty because of a treaty the United States has not
224. Id. at 37-38.
225. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (No. 07-343) (2008 WL
1741235) [hereinafter Oral Argument Transcript].
226. Id. at 21-26.
227. Id. at 41-42.
228. Id. at 42.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 53.
231. Id. at 54; see Brief of Leading British Law Associations, Scholars, Queen's Counsel, and
Former Law Lords as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Patrick Kennedy, Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641
(2008) (No. 07-343), 2008 WL 706791.
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ratified, the American Convention on Human Rights and] because other nations
have made [contrary] determinations" 232 to those made by states like Louisiana.
According to counsel, such a view of American power should not prevail before
the Court.233
These arguments firmly demonstrate that lawyers have learned the lesson
taught by the Justice Kennedy block on the Court - international law matters in
Eighth Amendment cases.
Kennedy v. Louisiana was especially important because of the nature of the
issue presented. As a matter of decisional law, the Court had not allowed capital
punishment outside of the crime of murder. The Court's decision, on June 25,
2008, preserved that rule by invalidating the Louisiana child rape death penalty.234
The recent trend towards restriction of capital punishment in the United States, and
the concomitant respect accorded world opinion against the death penalty, were
sustained by the decision, even though no direct references were made to
international or foreign law.235
Structurally, the Kennedy decision, written by Justice Kennedy, followed the
traditional approach utilized in Atkins and Roper of looking broadly for a national
consensus for or against executing child rapists and then bringing the Court's own
judgment to bear on whether this practice conforms to evolving standards of
decency.236
Looking at existing objective evidence of consensus, the majority was forced
to conclude that neither existing legislation-based practices nor national trends
supported the Louisiana approach. Only 6 states, including Louisiana, imposed the
death penalty for child rape.23' Congress excluded child rape from death penalty
232. Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 225, at 54.
233. Id. at 53-54.
234. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2646. In an unusual procedural development, the Court invited the
submission of new briefs by the parties to Kennedy on a petition for rehearing filed by the U.S. Solicitor
General's Office. See Order 07-343 entered on September 8, 2008; Supplement Brief for Respondent in
Support of Petition for Rehearing, Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (No. 07-343), 2008 WL 4359580
[hereinafter Supplemental Brief for Respondent]. The petition was based on the omission from the
original briefs in the case of any reference to a 2007 Executive Order authorizing the death penalty for
rape of a child under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. See Supplement Brief for Respondent at 1-
2; Exec. Order No. 13,447, 72 Fed. Reg. 56, 179 (Sept. 28, 2007). The Court sought input on whether
the omission required rehearing of the case on the question of whether the majority was correct in
concluding that there is a national consensus against the death penalty for child rapists. See Order 07-
343 entered on September 8, 2008.
235. Surprisingly, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion made only one cursory and general reference
to international law. He noted that evolving standards of decency have historically been measured by
"norms that 'currently prevail"' in society. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2649 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 311 (2002)). These norms take into consideration "'historical development[s] .... legislative
judgments, international opinion, and the sentencing decisions juries have made."' Kennedy, 128 S. Ct.
at 2650 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982)) (emphasis added).
236. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005); see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
237. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2651. The six states that imposed death penalty for child rape were
Louisiana, Georgia, Montana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas. Id.
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crimes under the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, even though the federal death
penalty does apply to some non-homicide offenses.238 Kennedy would have been
the first death row inmate to be executed for rape since 1964.239 The Court
concluded that, not only was there no emerging consensus in favor of the death
penalty for child rapists, the evidence showed "an opinion against it."240
In terms of the Court's independent judgment of the challenged practice,
Justice Kennedy emphasized the historic focus of Eighth Amendment analysis on
"evolving standards of decency" and the restraint and moderation they require in
applying the death penalty. As applied to child rapists, "the death penalty should
not be expanded to instances where the victim's life was not taken."24 1 The "moral
depravity and . .. injury to the person and to the public [present in child rape do
not compare to those caused by intentional murder.]" 24 2 The ugliness of child rape
may prejudice jurors and "overwhelm a decent person's judgment" leading to
arbitrary and capricious capital sentencing; retribution would come at the expense
of the (young) victims of child rape (who would be forced to relive the experience
often and over a long period of time).243 These cases involve delicate questions of
reliability of evidence; and, applying the death penalty could deter reporting of
child rape. The majority's strongest, and broadest, reason for limiting capital
punishment to the crime of murder of individual citizens was captured in this
statement: "[w]hen the law punishes by death, it risks its own sudden descent into
brutality, transgressing the constitutional commitment to decency and restraint."2 44
Is there a majority on the Court that will move towards the views of Justice
Stevens?
CONCLUSION
Justice Stevens's powerful conclusion in his Baze concurring opinion, that
fundamental flaws in American death penalty law now require states to
legislatively abolish it,245 may trigger new efforts to initiate a direct constitutional
challenge to Furman v. Georgia246 and its rule that the death penalty is accepted by
American society and can be constitutionally imposed.247 These efforts can draw
on the existence of new and important restrictions on the death penalty established
by the U.S. Supreme Court and based in part on international law and world
238. H.R. Con. Res. 3355, 103rd Cong. (1994) (enacted).
239. Bill Mears, Rape a Child, Pay with Your Life, Louisiana Argues, CNN.coM, Apr. 15, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/04/15/rape.execution/index.html.
240. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2653.
241. Id. at 2659.
242. Id. at 2660.
243. Id. at 2660-61.
244. Id. at 2650.
245. Baze v. Rees, 128 U.S. 1520, 1546-48 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
246. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
247. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 242, 249-250 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting death penalty would
be cruel and unusual if discriminatory, arbitrary or disproportionately applied); Id. at 309-10 (Stewart,
J., concurring) (finding wanton application death sentence cruel and unusual in violation of Eight
Amendment); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168 (1976) (holding imposition of death penalty not per
se cruel and unusual punishment).
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opinion. Four Justices on the Court are now on record as welcoming further
challenges based on foreign law and international practice.248 Nonetheless, it is
still extremely difficult to imagine that Furman v. Georgia, and its rule that state
execution is constitutional, will be rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court any time
soon.
Therefore, as encouraged by Justice Breyer's statements at American
University,249 lawyers in the United States, must, at all court levels, continue to use
international law, foreign court decisions, and global political actions (such as the
global moratorium vote at the United Nations) to litigate for more limits on the
death penalty. The Court's decisions in Medellin, Baze, and Kennedy clearly
indicate that future litigation will focus on restrictions and restraints on capital
punishment rather than the Stevens abolitionist position. Accordingly, anti-death
penalty strategies must focus on capital punishment practices that are ripe for
challenge: execution of the mentally ill;250 the continuing and acute problems of
racial discrimination unsuccessfully attacked in McCleskey v. Kemp;25 1 the "death
row phenomenon" blocked from review in Knight v. Florida;252 or documented
shortcomings in jury selection and jury deliberation processes.253 Most
importantly, innocence-based exonerations 254 should be aggressively cited to make
the case that the pervasive risk of error in capital cases compels adoption of the
international position that the death penalty must be eliminated or severely
restricted.
The death penalty debate is ultimately a political rather than legal debate.
When international forums are available, they must be used to publicize and
condemn death penalty abuses. During the recent summer Olympics, why was
there not a firestorm of criticism over China's use of the death penalty equal to that
over political repression in Tibet or the treatment of the families whose children
were killed by the devastating Sichuan earthquake? 25 5 American credibility in
foreign and international affairs continues to be compromised by its presence on
the shortlist of world executioners.
The death machine of state execution could be shut down-quickly-by
legislative action. On the basis of cost alone, state legislatures should recognize
that the number one issue for Americans in 2008 and 2009-the troubled
economy-requires elimination of the multi-million dollar capital punishment
248. Those are Justices Stevens, Breyer, Kennedy, Ginsburg. See supra Part IV; supra text
accompanying note 214. The views of recently appointed Justice Sonia Sotomayor are unclear.
249. See supra Part IV (highlighting debate between Justices Breyer and Scalia).
250. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding capital punishment of mentally ill
prohibited by 8th amendment).
251. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
252. See supra note 34 (discussing "death row phenomenon").
253. See supra note 31 (discussing arbitrariness in jury selection and deliberation).
254. See supra notes 39, 56-59 and accompanying text (detailing death penalty innocence and
exonerations).
255. PD Online Forum, NGO Plays a Big Role in China Quake Relief PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE,
June 10, 2008, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91420/6426815.html.
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system. 256 How can any political leader justify capital punishment when studies
show that executions are vastly more expensive than the sentence of life in prison
without parole (LWOP).257Similarly, if, for whatever reason, Congress passed an
omnibus bill comprehensively eliminating the death penalty as a sentence for all
federal crimes (or at least limiting it to direct acts of terrorism) and substituting
LWOP in its place, the death penalty universe in the United States could change
very quickly.258
The death penalty must be made a more visible issue in American political
debate. At the very end of the 2008 Presidential campaign, neither candidate had
made a substantial critical statement about capital punishment or the personal,
political, and financial harm it causes.259  In the future, will President Obama
256. The current economic crisis is forcing states to reconsider the death penalty for cost reasons.
Emanuella Grinberg, Budget Concerns Force States to Reconsider the Death Penalty, CNN.COM, Mar.
25, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/03/02/economy.death.penalty/index.html.
257. See supra note 38 (evaluating costs of death penalty). The Death Penalty Information Center
website provides extensive information on the financial costs, state by state, of the American death
penalty system. DPIC, Costs of the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs-death-
penalty (last visited Sept. 13, 2009). These studies support two generalizations: state budgets are
severely burdened by the costs of capital cases; and, it is extraordinarily more expensive to prosecute a
death penalty case through to execution than it is to seek the penalty of life in prison without parole.
For example, in California, the additional cost of confining an inmate to death row, as compared to a
life sentence without possibility of parole, is $90,000 per inmate, per year, totaling approximately $63.3
million per year. California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, Report and
Recommendations on the Administration of the Death Penalty in California, S. Res. 44, 2003-04 Reg.
Sess., at 69-70 (Cal. 2004), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/rr-dp-official.html. In New Mexico,
prosecutors agreed to drop its pursuit of the death penalty against two defendants because the state
legislature did not have the necessary money for the defendant's representation in the capital defense
system. Adrianne Appel, Court Says, 'Pay Up-Or Let Live!', IPS News Service, April 23, 2008,
available at http://www.fadp.org/news/2008042404/.
258. On March 19, 2009, Senator Russell Feingold (D-W) introduced S. 650, the Federal Death
Penalty Abolition Act of 2009. The bill would effectively eliminate the death penalty as a sentence for
violations of federal criminal law. The Federal Death Penalty Abolition Act of 2009, S. 650, 111th
Cong. (as introduced by Senator Russell Feingold, in the Senate, Mar. 19, 2009).
259. After the Kennedy v. Louisiana decision was issued on June 25, 2008, both Presidential
candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain, issued statements criticizing the Court's ruling. These
comments appear to be their first on the subject of the death penalty during the 2008 campaign.
Democratic Senator Obama said "I think that the rape of a small child, 6 or 8 years old, is a heinous
crime, and if a state makes a decision that under narrow, limited, well-defined circumstances, the death
penalty is at least potentially applicable that that does not violate our Constitution." Joan Biskupic,
Justices Reject Death Penalty for Child Rapists, USA Today, June 26, 2008, at 4A, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-06-25-scotus-child-rape N.htm. On this general
subject, he went on, "I have said repeatedly that I think that the death penalty should be applied in very
narrow circumstances for the most egregious of crimes." Id. The Republican candidate, Senator John
McCain, called the decision "an assault on law enforcement's efforts to punish these heinous felons for
the most despicable crime. That there is a judge anywhere in America who does not believe that the
rape of a child represents the most heinous of crimes, which is deserving of the most serious of
punishments, is profoundly disturbing." Jame Oliphant, Supreme Court bans death penalty for child
rape, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/26/nation/na-
scotus26. The Republican candidate, John McCain, criticized the Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons
in a speech about the future of the federal judiciary given on May 6, 2008; "Sometimes the expressed
will of the voters is disregarded by federal judges, as in a 2005 case concerning an aggravated murder in
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extend his message of "change" to this basic human rights issue? Will politicians
continue to exploit the death penalty for votes? Will the issue remain outside
public consciousness? Lawyers, law professors, law students, and political
activists should force the debate over capital punishment into national political
discussions. World leaders can and should do so as well.
As a final matter, one can hope to see in the coming years more abolitionist
decisions like State v. Makwanyane2 60 in South Africa and Minister of Justice v.
261Burns in Canada. The opinions of judges in these and similar cases around the
world serve as a conscience for Americans. When foreign courts such as these
comprehensively set forth the practical, legal, and moral problems created by
modem death penalty laws they make it easier for judges in the United States to
respond positively to court challenges to American forms of capital punishment.
Court decisions like these can insure that international law will continue to matter
in U.S. constitutional interpretation. And, they can continue to weigh down the
branches of American death penalty law until they break.
the state of Missouri. As you might recall, the case inspired a Supreme Court opinion that left posterity
with a lengthy discourse on international law, the constitutions of other nations, the meaning of life, and
'evolving standards of decency'. These meditations were in the tradition of 'penumbras,' 'emanations,'
and other airy constructs the Court has employed over the years as poor substitutes for clear and
rigorous constitutional reasoning." Jeffrey Toobin, Comment, In McCain's Court, THE NEW YORKER,
May 26, 2008, available at http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2008/05/26/080526 taco talk
toobin.
260. State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 49-61, 451 (S. Afr.); see generally Mark S.
Kende, The Constitutionality of the Death Penalty: South Africa as a Model for the United States, 38
GEo. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 209 (2006) (advocating South Africa's death penalty stance should serve as
paradigm).
261. United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 7 (Can.).
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